The Foreign Policy Centre

The US, China and East Asia: 'Zero-sum' or 'win-win'?

2011-12-02T11:53:00.000Z

The US announcement that it is establishing a base in northern Australia could mark the most significant adjustment of US strategic and military presence in East Asia since the 1970s, or perhaps even since the establishment of military alliances with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in the 1950s.

The move has generally been seen, however, in narrower terms, as a response to perceptions of greater Chinese assertiveness over the last couple of years, itself perhaps partly prompted by a belief that the global economic crisis marked a turning point in the decline of global US power.

The zero-sum mentality which this thinking reflects is unfortunately prominent on both sides of the Pacific. Indeed, there are risks that this dynamic could turn into a classic 'security dilemma' scenario: two suspicious powers interpret as hostile moves which the other believes it is taking 'defensively' to try and improve its security. A vicious cycle could then lead to conflict.

Wiser counsel should prevail on both sides of the Pacific. But if we look at the wider context, there may even be some 'win-win' potential to be gleaned from the US's latest move.

For Washington, the last few years have been difficult for the US security posture in East Asia, and not just because of China. It is not just the behaviour of a few US personnel on Okinawa. Japanese political sentiment has been shifting following growing irritation at the effective outsourcing of the country's foreign and security policy to the US – one consequence of this may even be in constraining on improvements in Chinese-Japanese relations.

Nearby, in South Korea, an earlier administration reached agreement on a timetable for US troop withdrawals, though this was put on hold after Lee Myung-bak came to power in 2008. Further, it is difficult to envisage scenarios for hypothetical reunification of the Korean peninsula which involve US troops staying there, and are acceptable to all the parties in the region, particularly China.

The existing structure of the US presence in East Asia therefore seems unsustainable. But given the US's continued global interests and strength it is not realistic to expect the US to withdraw from the region.

Could we therefore see the Australian base as a possible precursor to a broader reconfiguration of US presence in East Asia? It allows the US to maintain its presence and the support for naval patrol of sea lanes (though there is more which needs to be said on naval activity another day), whilst creating space for future arrangements with South Korea and Japan which fit the evolving diplomatic and political realities more closely. This could be in the interests of all those in East Asia.

Turkey: A Country of Contradictions

2011-10-13T14:36:00.000+01:00

Jonathan Fryer

In foreign policy terms, Turkey is the new kid on the block: assertive in its support of the Arab Awakening and determined to be acknowledged as a major regional player. The previous policy of maintaining friendly relations with all its neighbours has been replaced by a more principle-based diplomacy, in which both Israel and Syria have started to feel Ankara’s disapproval.

Domestically, Turkey has been registering economic growth rates of which most European governments can only dream. Infrastructure is being upgraded, new universities are popping up all over the country and the energetic young workforce is gaining new skills, as Turkey wins new markets abroad. So the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan has much of which it can be proud.

However, there are many contradictions in its policies which are a dampener to enthusiasm among foreign observers. Though recent steps towards recognising the rights and injustices relating to minority communities are welcome, Turkey still has not gone far enough in admitting that it is a multicultural society whose long-term success can only be guaranteed by the recognition, even celebration, of that diversity. Whereas the concept of ‘one country, one people, one language’ served its purpose in the construction of the Turkish Republic, it is now out-dated, even harmful.

Mr Erdogan has made some concessions to Turkey’s Kurdish minority, including granting some linguistic and cultural rights, though much more needs to be done. Moreover, the return to armed conflict is a huge mistake – by both sides in the dispute – as there can never be a military solution to the Kurdish question. That can only come about through dialogue and compromise, in which Abdullah Ocalan must be a participant.

Until the Kurdish issue is settled it is unlikely Turkey could be admitted into full membership of the European Union, to which some European countries (notably Austria, Cyprus, France and Germany) are currently opposed. But that should not stop countries such as Britain that are firmly in favour of Turkey’s eventual membership, arguing the case, so that Turkey one day is embraced into the European family to which it belongs.

The writer and broadcaster Jonathan Fryer lectures part-time at SOAS. This is a summary of remarks he made at a recent meeting organised by FPC and the Centre for Turkey Studies and Development in the House of Commons.

Cameron at the UN

2011-09-30T17:08:00.001+01:00

Professor Jason Ralph

If David Cameron thinks Libya has drawn a line under the uncertainty caused by Britain’s Iraq debacle he is mistaken.

His speech to the General Assembly conveys the impression that the only thing wrong with the UN is a lack of will to act more forcefully in the face of repression. Condemnation of tyrannical regimes is taken for granted. Now we must go beyond that and act forcefully to promote democracy. Yet there has never been complete agreement on when and how best to protect human rights and the world remains divided. There is a range of opinions (and interests) and these often prevent consensus, even among established liberal democracies. Tony Blair did immense damage to liberal internationalism when he ignored this fact. Cameron and his LibDem partners shouldn’t make the same mistake.

The human rights declarations that Cameron mentioned do not give other states license to intervene in each other’s affairs. The moral imperative to ‘do something’ competes with legal and political considerations. Often rhetorical condemnation is the only thing a state is willing to do. That might seem hypocritical. But sometimes limited intervention is the most prudent course of action. More hard line policies - economic sanctions, military action - can do further harm to the victims of repression. They might also delegitimize home grown forms of resistance.

Making the judgment of when to go beyond rhetoric is difficult. If liberal interventionism is committed to the rule of law it should also be a multilateral one. This is for two reasons. The first is that public deliberation is at the heart of liberal internationalism. It can help deliver better outcomes. Anne-Marie Slaughter for instance acknowledges that ‘we [the US] would have gotten a better outcome in Iraq if we had really listened to other countries at the United Nations’. The second reason is that there are legitimacy costs to the state that unilaterally asserts it is acting in the common interest. Interventions on behalf of universal values have more claims to legitimacy if they are the result of representative forms of public deliberation.

Cameron recognises the issues. We should not impose western values. Democracy has to be developed patiently from the grass roots up. And on Libya he says the UN played a vital role in authorising international action. But potential problems can be found in the details. What exactly is ‘a vital role’? What would Cameron do in the future if his muscular form of liberalism was rejected by the Security Council? Would he seek to form his own ‘coalition of the willing’ as Bush and Blair did on Iraq? To intervene in Libya was a brave decision. But the claim that it is a model for liberal interventionism is only possible because all the pieces fell into place. None of our current political leaders have told us what they would do if they could not secure a UN mandate for moral action that they considered necessary.
The world has long abandoned the norm prohibiting intervention in the internal affairs of another state. A crucial turning point came in the early 1990s when the Security Council identified humanitarian crises inside Iraq and Somalia as threats to international peace and security. States invoked the peace enforcement principles found in Chapter VII of the UN Charter to go beyond rhetorical condemnation. Here the moral and legal imperatives were, at least for a while, aligned with the political will to act.

But then we had Bosnia and Rwanda. The moral imperative to go beyond the norm of non-intervention was not matched by the willingness to risk soldier’s lives on the ground. Tony Blair’s liberal interventionism was conceived in this period. The UN was failing not because it couldn’t agree on what to do. It condemned genocide. It was failing because states believed there was no national interest in doing right thing. Blair therefore took the realists to task. Foreign policy had to be ‘guided by a more subtle blend of mutual and self-interest and moral purpose’.

The problem for liberal internationalists is that Blair’s combination of the moral and political imperatives became too dominant. He never forgot the legal piece in the liberal internationalist’s jigsaw, but he certainly trimmed the awkward corners off it. The consequences need not be repeated at length. The Iraq war was wrong. It was illegitimate. And liberal interventionism was almost confined to the dustbin of failed foreign policy doctrines.

Of course the UN Security Council doesn’t always get it right. There’s no need to remind readers that the great power veto can be used unreasonably and this is the source of much frustration. But that does not give states license to ignore other multilateral procedures and the need for deliberation at the UN, especially when they claim to be acting on behalf of the universal values. Cameron is aware of this. But his emphasis on finding the will to act, risks losing sight of the mandate to act. Liberal internationalists need to find ways of reconciling these potentially competing imperatives. Blair tried and failed. Moving on from Iraq involves articulating how UK policymakers should act when the Security Council vetoes action they consider morally and politically right.

Jason Ralph is Professor of International Relations at the University of Leeds and a British Academy Mid-Career Fellow. His latest publication is ‘After Chilcot. The doctrine of international community and the UK’s decision to invade Iraq’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations Vol.13 No.3 August 2011.

They or Us?

2011-04-11T20:40:00.001+01:00

by Dr Titi Banjoko

The events of the last 6 months have recorded a number of firsts and a shift of power from the minority imposing their views and power on the people. But my late father used to say “Vox populi vox Dei" meaning the voice of the people is the voice of God. It refers to the idea that the king or the government ought to pay attention to the voice of the people. Nations have witnessed the power of the people to bring about and effect change in what was once seen as intractable structures. The status quo of having a sense of entitlement and patronage is no longer a fact.

Just over six months ago, there was a sense of apathy and of nonchalance which ruled the air and people watched as things were “seen to be done” but nothing changed. It was a case of watching “them” and seeing what “they” were doing with a sense of detachment.

The increasing awareness and knowledge that has occurred as a result of the events in the political arena has elevated the conscious awareness of people and their expectations. The old disease of ignorance has been cured by the social media. The constant flow of live information, pictures, thoughts, ideas and opinions via the social networks used by the people, against the propaganda sent via national networks used by the oligarchy, has resulted in the shift of power. This has the effect of increasing transparency which means that there has to be accountability and responsibility for all. People now believe that they can make a difference and have raised expectations of what they would like to see in their day to day life.

It’s not about “they” but “us”, it’s about collective social responsibility and we all need to be active participants in the democratic process. Politics will never be the same again, working for the votes either through campaigning as an incumbent and/or when in post is becoming an increasing reality.

Clarity of what parties and individuals stand for and how they expect to be judged is now a standard by which citizens can determine the democratic rule of their country.

The relevance of the ‘bread riots’ thesis for the Arab 1989

2011-02-25T18:59:00.003Z

The first months of 2011 witnessed a remarkable emergence of ‘people power’ on the streets of Tunis, Cairo, Benghazi and Sana’a and many other capitals. People in North Africa and the Middle East have voted with their feet and hands to confirm their complete and utter rejection of the authoritarian rules of their regimes’ game. Spurred on with the aid of new and emerging transnational media like the Qatar-based news network Al-Jazeera and social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter, Tunisia’s Jasmine revolution has showered other countries in the region with the sparks of civil revolt. As this is being written, these sparks are visible in Yemen, Algeria, Bahrain, and Morocco and of course Libya. Amazingly enough, these popular revolutions were not forecast on the political radar screen of any government, intelligence agency or think-tank around the world before they began erupting first in Tunisia and then elsewhere. Their trajectories and eventual outcome outcomes are as of yet unknown and unforeseeable, although what is quite clear is that they are the harbingers of a bottom-up reconfiguration of politics across the Arab Middle East that will empower civil society to challenge the political conditions of its existence more directly than ever before.

These extraordinary upheavals have done much to sink the coffin nails into the staid and antiquated orientalist arguments that Middle Eastern societies are content with and unwilling to challenge repressive, authoritarian governance and corrupt, unaccountable political and economic elites. It is in the context of these developments that the work of distinguished Tunisian scholar Larbi Sadiki should be analyzed more carefully, for in its argumentation and rationale it actually presage not just the collapse of these regimes on the basis of social revolts but also formulate a thesis of democratization based on the transformational power of these uprisings. Against the wind of much scholarship, which holds the effects of bottom-up uprisings and so-called ‘bread riots’ in a negative light with the likely outcomes being a slide into uncontrollable anarchy, further authoritarianism or the emergence of religious fundamentalists, Sadiki insists that these outcries of public anger are spaces of socio-political transformation which can rock the political foundations of repressive regimes to such an extent as to give vital oxygen to processes of political liberalization and ,in fact, democratization.

In his thesis of the democratizing potential of bread riots or riots in which the economic compact between rulers and ruled is violated, Sadiki contends that these are not just ‘rebellions of the belly’ or outbursts of spontaneous and apolitical anger. Rather, he reframes them as consciously political struggles for social justice and civil rights which have their grounding within the moral economy of Islam. Numerous koranic inscriptions prescribe a principled and conscientious relationship between the individual and his material world taking into full consideration the material inequities in society, especially befalling its weakest members (Sadiki 2010: 202). In reference to bottom-up uprisings of socio-economically motivated anger, Sadiki focuses on two specific interest groups. Firstly the khubz-istes, from the Arabic word for bread, whose deferent apathy erupts into anger when their daily livelihood comes under threat, and then secondly the hit-istes, literally, those leaning against the wall – in other words, the despondent and youthful unemployed.

The first group may be repeatedly co-opted by authoritarian regimes that maintain their place within the socio-economic system on a short-term basis. However, the hit-istes represent a much more volatile and impoverished social stratum which is most likely to sustain a social revolt with its pent-up frustrations at their inability to attain any type of meaningful and dignified future. Sadiki theorizes that these social groups come into conflict with the powers of authority at a critical juncture when the compact that maintains their grudging subservience to the state collapses. He terms this consensus as the ‘dimuqratiyyat al-khubz’ (democracy of bread). Thus, economically-motivated uprisings should not just be seen as short-term cries of frustration but rather politically-conscious expressions of anger and protest against ‘social inequality, corruption, nepotism, authoritarianism, and regime incompetence’ (Sadiki 2010: 215). As the cost of living for the majority of the population mushrooms against a backdrop of economic stagnation and malaise with the steady and progressive reduction of state subsidies for subsistence commodities, the contract between the state and these various groups is worn thin and its legitimating function for oppressive authority is eroded.

"It is against the backdrop of economic malaise that khubz-istes and dissident forces take to the streets en masse. In these protests the people’s taste for participatory politics is nurtured, and their dissidence is unleashed by directly challenging political authority. The rebellious street binds together political dissidents, marginals, the unemployed, and the disillusioned youth. They acquire a spontaneous solidarity and, in their common consciousness of being actual or potential victims of the regime, they direct their anger at high status and regime symbols." (Sadiki 2010: 214)

Although Sadiki is wary of assigning a definitive causal relation between these economically-motivated but politically-conscious social unrests and ensuing dynamics of political democratization, he points to the collapse of Sudan’s al-Numayri regime in 1985 and the political reforms that were introduced in Algeria and Jordan in the late 1980s as a result of bread riots, although the reforms were rolled back eventually. The recent collapse of the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes can be added to this list now too with a strong possibility of others joining them soon enough. It is this rare but extremely relevant focus on the dynamics of bottom-up, civil societal democratization contained within social unrest that provides a unique lens through which to interpret and contextualize the current developments in the Middle East. It distinguishes Sadiki and his work from the brunt of contemporary academia, although his scholarly interests and publications are diverse and focus centrally on the politics of resistance against social injustice and political hegemony. As an avid contributor to Al-Jazeera English, his articles are full of wit and disdain at the way in which authoritarian regimes and their Western hegemonical backers have denied and continue to deny their people the means to create for a dignified future. Simultaneously, he champions the role of social activists, civil society movements and the ordinary people on the street in their aspirations to have a genuine voice in how to shape this future.

Larbi Sadiki (2010) Rethinking Arab Democratization: Elections Without Democracy, Oxford University Press - http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Politics/ComparativePolitics/MiddleEast/?view=usa&ci=9780199562985

Larbi Sadiki (2011) ‘The 'bin Laden' of marginalisation’, Al Jazeera, Jan. 14 - http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/01/201111413424337867.html

Larbi Sadiki (2011) ‘Tunisia: A democratic roadmap’, Al Jazeera, Jan. 18 - http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/01/201111895219875257.html

Larbi Sadiki (2000) ‘Popular uprisings and Arab Democratization’, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 23(1), pp.71-95

A politics of inclusion: An Interview with Saad Eddin Ibrahim

2011-02-17T11:55:00.004Z

Given the recent upheaval's in Egypt the interview with Egyptian human rights activist Dr Saad Eddin Ibrahim in FPC Senior Research Associate Alan Johnson's 2008 book 'Global Politics After 9/11: The Democratiya Interviews' is worth revisiting (found on page 176).

How would China respond to a double dip recession?

2010-12-02T11:04:00.003Z

The Irish bailout and nervousness over other parts of Europe's economies again raises the question of whether we might see some sort of double dip recession, or even another global financial and economic crisis. Although this still remains hypothetical, it is worth thinking about how the Chinese authorities might respond were the global economy to collapse again.

As time goes on, this question becomes more relevant, not so much due to the aggregate size of the Chinese economy, but because it remains one of the fastest growing parts of the global economy. Back in 2008, the Chinese authorities' stimulus package did not just prevent a possible crisis in the PRC. China's GDP increase of 8.7% was a bright spot in global growth that helped save the world economy from an even worse fate.

Memories are strange things, and Chinese policymakers probably think of their actions then as a sign of responsible assistance to the global economy. It seemed that way in the west too, at the time, though any gratitude has since given way to condemnation of China's stability-focused approach to its exchange rate, and nervousness that China has gained just slightly too much economic clout over recent years.

All of this would be very relevant were we to witness another global downturn. From a Chinese perspective, I suggest there would be two main angles.

The first is the impact of any subsequent downturn on the Chinese economy itself. The 2007/8 shock was all the greater to China for the fact that it came after a major global boom during which Chinese GDP ballooned, but which also saw the country's exposure to global trade rise substantially (total trade reaching 67% of GDP in 2007).

China would clearly suffer again, though the next time could be rather different. The authorities have already tweaked policy to reduce the impact of an export shock, focused more on indigenous innovation and domestically-driven growth, and witnessed the organic drift inland of GDP growth to provinces less exposed to the global economy, particularly noticeable since 2007. The domestic incentives for Beijing to put together a second major stimulus to deal with any future global slowdown could therefore be lower.

Such a stimulus would also look unattractive because China is currently grappling with the consequences of the first stimulus package, particularly rising inflation, but also delays to its achievement of energy efficiency targets. The leadership will not want to enact measures which will exacerbate these fractures further.

Secondly, this needs to be put alongside the tense international environment over China's currency management - though in Asia views that it is continued US profligacy which is to blame probably have more traction. These tensions would make entreaties to China to boost the global economy out of another crisis politically more difficult; to turn this around, perhaps it would mean that any such boost might have to be more on China's terms than those of the west.

Africa is coming of age

2010-09-06T17:52:00.001+01:00

Dr Titi Banjoko

Africa is coming of age. 2010 sees 17 African countries celebrate 50 years of independence. Many questions are being asked by Africans and Non-Africans alike on whether the aspirations of independence have been achieved and the progress to date.

If reflection is based on post independent socio-economic progression only, are we asking the right question? After all the starting point at independence was freedom from colonial rule not economics. The goal was continued dependence or independence; in that respect the goal of independence has been achieved.

With independence comes responsibility and then accountability for socio-economic development. This is not achieved as a one off but as evolving process fraught with so many challenges that will eventually lead to maturity and ultimately success.

Recent years have seen African countries grow in understanding and awareness of who we are and how we fit into the wider global context. The increasing awareness has led to a greater insight into the issues, potentials and opportunities within Africa and the effect of external stakeholders. This journey of self discovery has led to numerous changes across Africa i.e. move from military to civilian rule, increasing calls from within to speed the developmental process, a growing and maturing media, civil society and a vibrant private sector.

Post independence African countries maintained and continued a strong relationship with colonial countries i.e. Anglo; Franco and Lusophone links. These historical ties are beginning to count for nothing as new relationships are courted and forged based on mutual respect and benefits.

The language and postural statements from both the West and Africa points to a shift in relationship from passive to active engagement; recipients of to partnership with from win –lose to a win –win and specifics over generalisation i.e. named African country rather than Africa.
The maturity of Africa and its coming of age is reflected in various sectors i.e. growth and expansion of African owned companies inside and outside Africa. The increasing self belief that Africans can and must solve the problems in Africa; is evidence of maturity.

The next fifty years will see the emergence of African countries on the global platform as a key economic player.

Africa has much to celebrate- there have been massive strides to reduce poverty improve literacy, infant mortality rates, life expectancy. Still, much needs to be done, with human rights abuses remaining an issue in many African countries, while poverty and disease continue to stalk parts of the continent, some of them which have known no peace and are ravaged by years of armed conflict.

Technology such as the internet and mobile phone has become a part of everyday life in Africa. More importantly it’s a tool that is used to increase the availability of information creating a more transparent and credible process for bringing leaders to account.

As the mass populace becomes more informed so will the level of accountability of the leaders, forcing the required change and development across the continent.

Friends no more? The consequences of Israel’s disastrous act of high-seas piracy for Turkish-Israeli relations

2010-06-04T17:33:00.003+01:00

Israel’s brazen and deadly assault onto the Gaza flotilla in international waters has created a crisis in Israeli-Turkish relations in comparison to which the accumulated history of recent bilateral tensions in the last 5 years completely pales. The current impasse is likely to result in a deep and long-lasting fissure, at least under an AKP-governed Turkey. 8 Turkish nationals as well as a US citizen of Turkish origin are known to have been killed by Israeli Special Forces during the raid on the Mavi Marmara, a converted cruise ship flying Turkish flags that had been chartered by a Turkish human rights organisation to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza. Of the approximately 600 people it was carrying, there were 400 Turkish citizens. These activists are being swiftly transferred back to their countries without prosecution which reflects Israel’s frantic desire to dampen the fall-out of this episode as quickly as possible and attempt to defuse the crisis with its closest friend in the Muslim world.

However, as the vociferous outrage being voiced by the Turkish government in the domestic and international arena amply shows, this is unlikely to happen. Turkey’s foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu described the incident as ‘murder conducted by a state’ while Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called it a ‘bloody massacre’. The country has been at the forefront of condemning the act in the United Nations and has recalled its ambassador to Israel. Joint military exercises have been scrapped and there is a possibility of Israeli diplomats being expelled from Turkey. Israeli tourism to Turkey, already in decline because of fractious bilateral relations in recent years, will drop considerably and economic trade between both countries will also suffer a dramatic knock-back. It is unlikely that contact between both countries will be completely severed and in time, depending to what extent Israel can show concrete progress in Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, they might recover to a degree that can be called amicable. However, the televised statements by Abdullah Gül, Turkey’s president, that Israeli-Turkish relations will ‘never be the same’ are a terse and fitting epitaph to the formerly strategic link between both countries which had been disappearing gradually in recent years and which was climactically torn apart last Monday by Israel’s disastrous act of high seas piracy.

The international and regional context amidst which this strategic relationship was formed in the mid-1990s no longer pertains. At that time, Turkey was eager to use Israel’s military might in a combined fashion to intimidate Syria, formerly a foe. It also wanted access to Israeli military technology as well as the considerable lobbying power that it possessed in American politics to counter the influence of Greek and Armenian Diasporas. The changes in Turkey’s domestic politics and external relations have neutralised many of these factors. The glacial re-orientation in Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle Eastern region under the rule of the Justice and Development party since 2002 has seen a dramatic normalisation of relations towards many neighbouring countries. This process has not just involved Middle Eastern states like Iran, Iraq and Syria but also Greece which Erdoğan recently visited suggesting substantial cuts in both countries military expenditure for the shared Aegean sea. This re-orientation became quite visible to Israel when Khaled Meshaal, the exiled leader of Hamas, travelled to Turkey on an official visit in 2006.

In the last decade, Turkey has become increasingly comfortable and confident with its evolving position as an upwardly mobile regional and international actor. Repeatedly frustrated by the floundering state of its EU accession prospects as well as the fading power of its erstwhile vital relations with the US, it has focused more energy, using its economic soft power and diplomatic assets, on expanding its relations with its Caucasian, Central Asian and Middle Eastern neighbourhood. In the last years, Erdoğan’s stature in the Middle Eastern context has mushroomed to that of a regional leader, although there is also plenty of quiet resentment and scepticism amongst the Arab governments at the intrusion of this outsider. The well-televised spat between Shimon Peres and Turkey’s temperamental Prime Minister at the 2009 Davos conference reinforced his allure amongst the Arab public as a statesman prepared to loudly and boldly voice his anger at the treatment of Palestinians in the international forum. This was undoubtedly a welcome change from the petty, behind-the-scenes squabbling which characterised the Arab League's belated reaction to Israel’s siege of Gaza. Turkey, with Erdoğan at its helm, is in the process of becoming the predominant regional spokesperson for the plight of the Palestinians in the Middle East which gives it considerable political capital. Egypt’s decision to briefly open its crossing to Gaza for humanitarian aid illustrates its discomfort at being steadily displaced by Turkey in the Arab world.

Naturally, there is also a strong domestic political dimension to the Turkish government’s prominent stance towards the Palestinians. In the face of high unemployment, the uncertainty of future economic growth and a rejuvenated political opposition ahead of next year’s national elections, highlighting Turkey’s active role in this issue is a sure vote-winner for the AKP. The plight of the Palestinians is one of the few international issues which has persistently concerned and animated Turkish public opinion. Certainly this concern is motivated by feelings of religious solidarity but it has little to do with the so-called conspiratorial Islamization theses which are so popular in American neo-conservative circles. Already, in 2002, under the preceding coalition government which was led by mainstream centre-left and centre-right parties, Prime Minister Bülent Eçevit, a staunchly secular social democrat, accused Israel of carrying out a ‘genocide’ against the Palestinian people after the start of the second intifada.

This is the domestic, regional and international background amidst which Israel chose to carry out its bloody raid in international waters to stop a convoy of humanitarian aid resulting in the deaths of 9 people, of which 8 are Turkish nationals. The immediate fury amongst Turkey’s political elites as well as its public, reinforced by almost unanimous international condemnation, is quiet understandable and will be extremely difficult to assuage in an age of 24-hour audio-visual news media where events outpace the public relations machinery of governments. However, even if this where to somehow miraculously occur, the long-term transformations at the domestic, regional and international level that have influenced Turkey’s foreign policy calculations in the last decade will act against a rejuvenation of a strong and strategic Turkish-Israeli relationship. Thus it seems that Israel has scuttled its chances of recuperating its sole ally in the Muslim world at high sea.

Sarkozy saves the day at the European summit

2010-03-26T17:44:00.005Z

There may be many captains currently manning the EU ship – Herman Van Rompuy as head of the European Council, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero as holder of the rotating EU Presidency, Jose Manuel Barroso as Commission President, and Jean-Claude Junker as eurogroup Chairman – but it is French President Nicolas Sarkozy who’s managed to pull the eurozone back from the brink at this week’s European Council.

On Thursday morning, Germany’s Angela Merkel had still not agreed to meet her fellow eurozone heads of government to strike a deal on how to avert Greece’s potential default – without a humiliating intervention by the IMF –, but in a bilateral meeting just before the start of the European Council, Sarkozy concluded his energetic, week-long lobbying of Chancellor Merkel with a tightly-worded agreement on a support mechanism. In a coffee break later on, eurozone leaders were gathered together to approve the plan.

So what’s the deal?

The loan mechanism, which will only come into play should Greece make a formal request for support, would consist of a majority of bilateral loans by eurozone governments – calculated according to their capital weighting in the European Central Bank (ECB), making Germany the biggest contributor – and “substantial” IMF financing. There would be a unanimous vote of eurozone Members to disburse the loans - thus giving each a veto – and the mechanism would subject the receiving country to “strong conditionality” – relating to budgetary discipline - and assessment by the European Commission and ECB.

For Merkel, IMF involvement was a pre-condition for the deal and something of a political face-saver, given her staunch resistance to a eurozone support mechanism in the past weeks. ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet has called it a “workable solution”, but will privately not be happy with IMF involvement. Nor will Greece, which fears IMF demands for the dismissal of public sector workers or further pay cuts. In addition, another key part of the bargain for Merkel is commitment to stricter economic and budgetary surveillance as well as stronger enforcement mechanisms against profligate Member States. A new crisis resolution framework will also be put in place. To work out all the details of this tougher stance on fiscal discipline and crisis management, a taskforce will now be set up by Van Rompuy and the Commission, composed of Member State representatives, the rotating Presidency, and the European Central Bank, which will report by the end of this year.

The new bailout deal is also accompanied by a pledge to strengthen economic governance – vociferously championed by France - with proposals due to be submitted by the Commission to the next European Council in June. All in all, Sarkozy’s had a good couple of days and can return home as a European hero, following his disastrous regional election results.

The European Council also made a first general agreement on the EU’s new growth and jobs strategy, Europe 2020 – including a headline target to raise employment to 75% - while pushing back to June decisions on the more controversial targets on education and poverty reduction proposed by the European Commission. One key element – relating to the synchronization of coordination mechanisms of Europe 2020 with the Stability and Growth Pact so that moves towards greater fiscal sustainability are made compatible with growth initiatives – was rejected, largely because of Chancellor Merkel’s objections.

In addition, Europe’s leaders reiterated their climate targets and climate financing commitments, showing that, despite their humiliating marginalization in the corridors of the Copenhagen summit, they have not renounced their claim to leadership in negotiations for a post-2012 global climate framework.

Overall, the European Council managed to take the most urgent decisions to maintain the credibility of the EU and the euro, but essential questions remain unanswered on core European policies for securing economic recovery and generating new sustainable growth in the coming years.

European leaders bicker over Europe’s economic future

2010-03-25T11:51:00.002Z

Just what is going in the EU at the moment? The elation felt at the end of last year with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, after almost a decade of difficult negotiations and three failed treaty referenda, has quickly given way to discord amongst European leaders on the biggest political issues it’s facing.

Bickering has characterized the weeks leading up to today and tomorrow’s European summit of leaders. One of the big disputed issues is how to deal with the Greek economic crisis – and more generally eurozone governance. With the euro at an all-time low against the dollar – betraying a loss of market confidence in Europe’s ability to manage its own economic problems – many EU leaders including France’s Nicolas Sarkozy, believe there needs to be a mechanism for supporting distressed eurozone economies like Greece, for the long-term viability and strength of the single currency.

Others, led by the redoubtable Angela Merkel of Germany, simply don’t want to bear the financial implications of a bailout mechanism, despite the chaotic impact on the euro. Staunch fiscal disciplinarians in Germany believe such a mechanism would encourage wayward spending behaviour and simply want to expel countries from the eurozone for not meeting the deficit limits of the Stability and Growth Pact.

So what of European solidarity, one of the key cornerstones of the EU project? The European Commission President Barroso has now taken the extraordinary step of reminding European leaders that the treaty does not allow the expulsion of any Member state from the eurozone. But despite vague proclamations on EU commitment to Greece, there appears to be no resolution to this deep-seated divergence. It’s doubtful today’s summit will make any progress, as evidenced by Angela Merkel’s refusal to agree to a special meeting of eurozone heads of government today, proposed by Presidents Zapatero and Sarkozy.

European leaders – in addition to political parties, trade unions and business lobbies - also appear to be in disagreement over the fundamentals of another big item on today’s agenda, a new ten-year strategy for growth and jobs, the so-called Europe 2020 strategy. The European Commission has proposed five headline targets for employment, R&D spending, climate change, for early school leavers and those participating in tertiary education, and for poverty reduction. Policy warnings would be issued to countries failing to meet the targets. The other major element of the proposal is to synchronise the coordination mechanisms of Europe 2020 with the Stability and Growth Pact so as to make deficit-busting compatible with pro-growth investments.

But Chancellor Merkel has again put a spanner in the works by complaining that setting targets for education could infringe on Germany’s federal competences (despite the fact that Europe already boasts more than one education target). Merkel also claims that synchronizing the coordination mechanisms would “politicize” the Stability Pact. At the same time, finance ministers also issued a joint statement last week criticizing both the 3% GDP R & D target and the target for taking 20 million people out of poverty, stating that a wider indicator should be chosen for research and innovation, while the “principle and the correct design” of the social inclusion target should be further considered.

Criticisms of Europe 2020 from outside Member governments further create the impression that there’s a long way to go to create the necessary momentum for a successful ten-year economic strategy. Europe’s federation of labour parties - the Party of European socialists – believes there is little in the current proposal to incentivise investment and job creation initiatives needed to turn around Europe’s economic fortunes. The European Trade Union Confederation is similarly scathing, claiming that Europe 2020 should really be addressing crisis-related initiatives for 2010, without which it will be impossible to pull out of recession and create jobs once more. While Europe’s main business lobby, Business Europe, has criticised the lack of urgency and focus in the strategy, arguing for a “Go for Growth” target of 2% by 2014.

For a proposal that was meant to generate a new drive amongst Member States and stakeholders to boost Europe's growth and competitiveness, the European Commission’s proposal has left many underwhelmed.

And with so much disagreement on the fundamental next steps for the European project, there appears little prospect for success – beyond the usual political platitudes - at today and tomorrow’s European Council.

Voting against Change?

2010-03-10T17:35:00.001Z

It is six in the morning and I am sitting in the dark in my apartment in Sulimaniyah, huddled round the blue light of my computer. I have been up for an hour, and just before six the electricity always goes. The man who is employed to fire up our generator doesn’t start work until nine, when we are blessed with heat and light once again.

What am I doing writing when I should be taking the excuse to stay in bed? I’m not sure. I have been finding it difficult to sleep recently. The gunfire might have something to do with it.

There has been rather a lot of night-time gunfire in recent days in Suli. When it started, around 9pm on election day, I did transfer myself and my computer onto the floor, out of the way of the windows, and send a slightly worried text to a colleague. But as she reassured me, it’s not really anything to worry about. At that time, both the main parties in Sulimaniyah had begun to claim victory; and the Kurds like nothing better than to shoot a few rounds skywards in celebration.

That first night was the noisiest – I am sure some of my immediate neighbours were joining in with some serious rifles – and one child was rumoured to have been injured by a stray bullet. Nothing brings home how many armed guards there are in this city quite like hearing all of them get a bit excited with their rifles, all at once. I am told that, as in parts of America, most families here also own a gun, so there is no shortage.

Much of the firing that night took place at the Hill, the headquarters of the opposition Goran ('Change') party. This is just across the road from us, which explains the noise level. During a lull, a colleague decided to leave the building with her husband, and drive to a friend’s home for a visit. On the way back they stopped to see what was happening on the Hill. This turned out to be a mistake, as they were forced to hide behind a car to dodge bullets.

The shots have been less frequent in the days since then. Although my insomnia last night was caused by what sounded like someone shooting bears at our neighbour’s house (it turned out to be fireworks), this represented a break in a basically peaceful evening.

I wonder if this is indicative of the way the results are turning locally. Of course, it will be until we get the official results, but rumour has it that the opposition Goran party, which won Sulimaniyah governorate in the 2009 provincial election, will not win the city this time around. Following on from big public shows of support during campaigning, this might be coming as a shock to the Goran loyalists who were so enthusiastic on election night.

If this turns out to be true, it would probably be justifiable to say that a fair bit of fraud was involved. Sulimaniyah tends not to be on the scale of other parts of Iraq - for instance, an international election monitor has recently told one of the editors I work with that the election in Kirkuk was so crooked it should be re-run completely. But there have been many accusations and rumours, and some of my friends personally know people co-opted by the city’s dominant political party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, to make sure no one in the largely PUK-controlled public services votes for Goran.

Goran’s victory in Sulimaniyah last year was not sweeping. But since then, various serving elected officials have defected from the PUK or its allies to Goran, unofficially swinging the governorate further towards Goran and thus provoking PUK ire. The 2010 national election has nothing to do with the 2009 provincial election in theory – Iraqi Kurdistan runs on a complicated two-government system – but the PUK may fear that Goran can formalise its de facto power by winning seats in Sulimaniyah.

This might be the reason behind any PUK fraud; and it shows how intensely local politics are around here. The fact that Goran has reportedly lost out in Suli but gained elsewhere in the Kurdish region in this election, suggests that PUK power playing is tightly concentrated on this third of the Kurdish region and this city in particular. The region’s other main power base, the capital city of Erbil, is controlled by the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and the PUK clearly do not see a Goran victory there as a threat worthy of their effort. Sulimaniyah politics does not care about what is happening in Erbil, let alone in Baghdad.

The Independent High Electoral Commission is scheduled to announce the election results on Friday – a remarkably quick turnaround in my opinion, given the various tactics and machinations that have to happen under Iraq’s complicated system of redistributing excess votes. When the announcement comes, then the knives will come out.

For now, I don’t think anyone will be staging a firing party at 6.30 in the morning, so perhaps it would be a good idea to open my curtains. Ah! Daylight...

Up on the Hill is where you'll find us

2010-03-06T16:06:00.000Z

We are now in the final stages of the pre-election effort in Iraq – and the day before the vote, fingernails are being sharpened.

Last night another large rally honked its way past my apartment, this time PUK. I would guess that over a thousand people went past over two or three hours, including a fairly impressive motorcade of about 50 identical white jeeps covered in party flags. It seemed larger than the somewhat more ragtag and unofficial opposition Gorran (‘Change’) brigade that went past last week. However, the PUK’s front is deceptive – it may not be as dominant as it seems. At a static rally on the Hill last Wednesday, it was reported that around 10,000 gathered. I have also heard unconfirmed reports that the PUK has paid people up to $200 to participate in rallies in the past week. It could be that Change is in the air, not just up on the Hill.

The PUK’s tactics are also hardening at polling stations. The police and other security forces across Iraq voted on Friday, to free them up for duty on Sunday when everyone else votes. Already some are crying fraud. Allegations are emerging that some officers in Sulimaniyah governorate were declared illiterate and assigned another officer to accompany them into the voting booth to ‘assist’ them – something that is known to have happened in various places during the last election. Several high up security officials have announced in the media that they voted for Gorran, in a pre-emptive attempt to avoid being sacked on trumped up charges, as happened in the last election to some who were suspected of opposition sympathies. This time, officials are giving the media all the facts they need to put two and two together. If they are sacked, the Gorran-controlled media will have a strong story and will make a serious fuss.

In Sulimaniyah, the PUK largely controls the security forces – indeed, a colleague who visited the headquarters of the city security forces, Asaysh, two weeks ago saw police cars decorated with PUK flags in preparation for a rally. Thus the party is particularly sensitive to security officials whose loyalty is questionable. The PUK, still dominant but very much the old establishment, is clearly feeling threatened.

In the interests of neutrality, I should point out that Gorran supporters have been accused of attacks and violence just as frequently as those of the ruling PUK-KDP ‘Kurdistani’ coalition in recent weeks. They are by no means angelic. But they do seem to be pulling large support and might, just possibly, be a more serious threat to the Kurdistani coalition than in the 2009 elections.

Much of Gorran’s support surely stems from the simple fact that it is the new, dynamic, fresh option in Kurdistan – an interesting Youtube video compares Gorran’s leader Nawshirwan Mustafa with Che Guevara. But the party also seems to be making some moves towards national reconciliation which might be pulling voters. In Kirkuk, it is “appealing to voters across ethnic lines, pushing ... services and anti-corruption,” according to a report by the media development NGO IWPR.

Gorran is also requiring all candidates to speak good Arabic. Although the Kurdistani alliance apparently also expects this from its parliamentarians, not all do speak Iraq’s main language, and this seriously restricts their ability to speak in the national parliament. In Iraq’s Council of Representatives or parliament, only Arabic is used and there is no translation. My journalist colleagues have been told by some sources that current Kurdish seat holders, all of whom come from the Kurdistani coalition, do not speak in parliament because they do not understand the proceedings.

This could, however, have its own disadvantages. I have heard of at least one candidate who was approached by Gorran and asked to stand because of his excellent Arabic, despite his having no political or legislative experience whatsoever. The requirement may also have cut young candidates out of the running – it is now almost 20 years since the Kurdistan region became largely independent from Baghdad, and increasingly few young Kurds speak Arabic.

If Gorran does manage to field – and get elected – good, competent Arabic-speaking candidates, it will be making a serious effort towards national reconciliation. While some fiercely argue that Kurds should be allowed to speak Kurdish, since the language is recognised in the Iraqi constitution, others point out that this will do nothing to heal divides between the two groups in parliament. It is certainly the case that Kurds who can build alliances across Iraq’s many divides, rather than stick out as voices of confrontational patriotism, will be more successful in meeting their aims on the national stage. Perhaps Gorran, the new challenger to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and its allies, has realised this.

Change comes to Sulimaniyah

2010-03-04T21:04:00.001Z

On the hillside above Sulimaniyah, there is a large luminous number. Picked out in white lights, ‘372’ sits on the hill at night like a strange pun on the white horses more familiar to the British. A red tick occasionally flashes on and off, just to the left.

When I first saw this from my top-floor apartment, I was utterly mystified. My colleague explained: it’s the number of the candidate list for the ruling Kurdistani Alliance in Iraq’s upcoming election. It is an open list election, where voters can vote for one of the numbered lists (effectively voting for just a party) or they can vote for a single candidate from within a list. Taking an innovative approach to campaigning, the alliance is literally drawing on the landscape the tick that it wants Iraqis to place this coming Sunday.

The scale of this advert speaks volumes about the power of the PUK in this Iraqi Kurdish city, where there is a fierce and sometimes dangerous battle going on between the Kurdistan region’s ruling coalition, of which PUK is a large part, and the new opposition Change party, or Gorran in Kurdish. No less so, the fact that Mr or Ms 372 has placed a light show on the exact opposite side of the city to the Change headquarters, known as Gorran Hill or simply the Hill. In this behemoth Change runs its media empire – the party was founded by a media boss who is now using his TV, radio and print outlets to maximum effect. Facing up to the Hill across the bowl where Sulimaniyah nestles, the PUK list number expresses political rivalry in the very hills that the Kurds of this area so identify with.

There is also some smaller scale imagery to be had around town. Because of the high number of candidates on the lists, campaign posters are fairly uniform to give maximum space to the candidate’s identifying number and a photo of him or her looking varyingly dignified, supercilious, scornful or terrified. Another colleague’s favourite is a pale man who, he says, look like his mum made him stand. But there is little space for party symbols, so the politicians of Sulimaniyah instead use party flags, which adorn every street.

The flags of the ruling coalition feature symbols of power, force and conservatism: a white horse with mane streaming, a hand holding up a red flower. Such symbols are quite beautiful yet have a traditional look: no one has paid much attention to rebranding for some time. Change, on the other hand, has the advantage of both its infancy and, presumably, a ready set of graphic designers at its newspaper offices. The flags have a more rounded, friendly and up to date look, and feature a yellow candle on a dark blue background. The message is clear: hope.

More than one cartoon in the Kurdish press has linked Change’s language and rhetoric with the Obama campaign since the party emerged in 2008. And the Change movement’s messages seem to be rallying a large and fervent support base, especially among youth. Change is able to position itself, as Obama did, as the outside candidate, refreshingly different from the established parties which have fought over and tightly controlled the Kurdish region for two decades. This is especially the case in Sulimaniyah, where the security forces are widely thought to be controlled by the PUK and have frequently been accused of attacks on Change activists in the run-up to the election.

As we saw in the US in 2008, imagery matters, whether it is visual or embodied in words - and the themes of change and hope make a powerful combination. On a wall next to my local supermarket is a mural proclaiming in English ‘we are going towards light’, and it does seem that Change’s candle has captured imaginations.

Will it bring them victory? I’m not sure. I witnessed the fraught Pakistani election in 2008, and was struck by the simplicity and accessibility of the symbol of former President Musharraf’s party, an elegant line drawing of a bicycle heading off into the distance. It represented everyday, easy social mobility – almost everyone can afford a bicycle, it said, and with our bicycle you can speed towards great things. But of course, this great imagery did little for the party of the disgraced military dictator, which plummeted in the poll.

Gorran seems to have a wave of support just as big as in last year’s elections, its first, when it won a good chunk of the vote. If it makes further gains this time, and especially if it wins a majority, the party will have to show its fans that it can back up its images – that it can really deliver change as well as hope.

Time for Turkish political renewal

2010-03-04T11:15:00.001Z

(Published in the March edition of BN Magazine)

As the UK prepares for what promises to be the most genuinely competitive election campaign for 18 years, Turkey is again mired in political squabbling over the role of the army and the media in Turkish public life, posing serious questions about its political future.

It has been 13 years since the so-called ‘post-modern coup’ where a military memorandum pushed the Welfare Party, of which both Prime Minster Erdoğan and President Gül were members, out of power before it was banned by the constitutional court on the grounds of promoting Islamic fundamentalism. As we know, Turkish political history has been pockmarked by coups and military interventions into political life, so the current tensions have caused some twitchiness, even though, thankfully, the balance of probability seems to remain against such a drastic turn of events.

However, as I write, the pro-AKP press are leading with the on-going revelations of military malfeasance in the ‘Sledgehammer’ case, where former top brass are alleged to have plotted attacks on an airliner and on mosques to create the grounds for an intervention. This is the second major blow to the military’s image after the Ergenekon investigation into its clandestine activities in the 1990s. At the same time, the republican media establishment is busily highlighting the latest in a series of press freedom worries that are in part due to the mix of Erdoğan’s populist style and his falling poll ratings.

For too long the only significant challenge to the AKP government has come from groups outside the democratic process: the courts (who almost dissolved the party in 2008), the media and the military. At last years local elections, while the AKP lost ground, there was no overwhelming recipient of the anti-government vote. Instead, it was disbursed amongst a number of different parties. The main opposition CHP, the party of Ataturk, has been encumbered by a leader in Deniz Biykal who has performed poorly in almost every public election he has stood in, while winning every internal factional battle to remain in charge.

We are in a time when new political movements, that can flower far faster in Turkey than would be the case in Britain, can help shake up the political process in a way not seen since the years of political flux in the 1990s. The Turkey’s Movement for Change (TDH) Mustafa Sarigül, a speaker at an FPC event in March, may be a movement that can transform the Turkish political environment by ploughing a modernising path between the CHP and AKP, or it could sparkle and then quickly fade as others have in the past.

It is critical for Turkey’s future that there is strong electoral completion and a real choice for voters at next year’s elections, so that power can be retained or change hands peaceably and without recourse to anti-democratic methods. In Britain, we may be about to see the end of one-party political dominance at a national level and the start of a period of smaller majorities, or even minority governments or coalitions. Turkey may be heading for the same political future.

A rainy election trail in Iraqi Kurdistan

2010-03-02T10:50:00.002Z

Ella Rolfe

Kurdish party politics is a strange business. Driving through the city of Sulimaniyah in Iraq’s northern Kurdish region last Saturday evening, in torrential rain, I passed a political rally in full swing. Outside the headquarters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan or PUK, the area’s dominant party, about a hundred people were gathered, waving flags, making noise, blocking the road, jumping up and down. A few jabbed umbrellas up and down as they chanted – most just looked drenched. My travelling companion commented that since this is spring rain, people are not afraid they will fall ill, despite the freezing cold.

The Kurds are known for their endurance of the harsh climate of their mountainous region, and also for their fierceness in war. Both endurance and fierceness seem to be central to Kurdish election preparations. Campaigning for Iraq’s upcoming election officially opened at midnight of 11-12 February; by half past the hour, the area around my apartment block were filled with activists. By morning, each street was criss-crossed with strings of flags of at least three different parties.

And the campaign busses started. Almost every evening since then – over two weeks – cars and busses crammed with supporters of one party or another have screamed past my home, horns blaring and with huge flags poking out of every available space. Occasionally an entire rally consisting of twenty or more motorbikes and a few pickup trucks has cascaded by. One night this street entertainment is dominated by the ruling coalition of the PUK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party or KDP, with green flags or the tricolour of Iraqi Kurdistan’s flag; another night it will be the blue banners of the opposition, Change, that colour the scene. Always, the busses are full of young men. It’s like football, but louder.

After a week of this, the city authorities apparently tried to ban such campaigning after 9pm. It made no difference, and no one is sure if the ban is still in effect. For the last couple of days, rain has reduced the frequency, but the occasional pickup motorcade still swings by.
Such vociferous campaigning stems partly from history. Kurdistan’s two main parties, the PUK and the KDP, spent much of the 1990s engaged in a bloody civil war against each other, with the KDP occasionally backed by Saddam Hussein’s regime against their fellow Kurds and Iran weighing on both sides at various points. Although the two parties signed a peace agreement in 1998 and are now working together, each still controls much of local government, security forces, and media in one half of the Iraqi Kurdistan region.

In this context, political parties have been the main forum for loyalties and group identity within the region for decades. Kurds are not too concerned about ethnic or religious differences among themselves, and so political party alliances replace these to run deep and strong in the region’s culture. The seismic political shift in last year’s provincial elections, with the KDP and PUK allying and the emergence of the new opposition Change party (Gorran in Kurdish), has simply upped the ante.

I am not sure that these tactics succeed in winning votes from the undecided. Indeed, they can be intimidating. There have been several violent clashes in the last two weeks between supporters of rival parties, and between campaigners and police. On February 16, PUK supporters attacked a Change rally, wounding three and kidnapping 13 according to the Change statement; and there have been similar scuffles since. Gun shots are heard almost every night in Sulimaniyah – I am told many are fired in the air, but I do wonder about those that are not.
Kurdistan is often seen as a safe haven in Iraq, and consequently the election here is getting less media attention. After all, in Sulimaniyah people are injured – in Baghdad, they are more likely to be blown up. But politics is just as contentious in Sulimaniyah as in other areas where sect or ethnicity dominate.

As I write, shouts and car horns float up to my fourth floor window. The rain has stopped and the bus boys are back, this time with a megaphone. I didn’t think they would be deterred for long.

Addressing the Baathist Legacy in Iraq

2010-02-26T14:34:00.001Z

Ella Rolfe

On Friday 29 January, the UK enquiry into the 2003 Iraq war heated up as former British Prime Minister Tony Blair was questioned. For several weeks the British media had been speculating on what might be revealed in the session. In Iraq, in contrast, there has been no media coverage of the enquiry. No one seemed to care with the outcome of the process will have no impact in the occupied nation itself.

However, there is a story here. Iraq’s preparations for the March 7 election have already been marred by political controversy - and part of this can be traced back to the attitudes underpinning the western intervention. The roots of the current anti-Baathist fever among Iraq’s politicians can be seen in the way Blair framed his evidence.
During over five hours of questioning, there was very little mention of any aspect Iraqi figure other than former dictator Saddam Hussein himself.

The coalition seems to have focused almost entirely on getting rid of the figurehead, with little attention paid to other leaders in Saddam’s Baathist party. As Blair told the enquiry, “the only commitment I gave [then-US president George Bush] was to deal with Saddam.” This narrow focus, neglected Iraq’s need to deal effectively with the wider Baathist leadership. This is reflected in the failure of today’s politics to move on.

Saddam was, of course, executed along with three key associates in 2006. But only a handful of the other 50,000 Baathists that the Bush administration estimated would not be suitable for integration into the post-Saddam regime have been tried – most simply dismissed from their posts and are still free. No one has been called to account for most of the crimes committed under Saddam.

Because there has not been formal justice process for former Baathist leaders, there has been no process of coming to terms with the abuses of the era. The whole issue is, seven years on, still raw and open to exploitation.

And with the election coming, this is just what is happening. This was illustrated recently by a ban on 511 candidates who were allegedly former Baath party members, by Iraq’s Accountability and Justice Commission. The commission presented no evidence of any crimes committed by these candidates. Most Baath party members (95% according to a US estimate in 2003) were obliged by their government jobs to join; yet no distinction is begin made in the widespread anti-Baath rhetoric now prevalent among all Iraq’s major political parties.
Anti-Baathism is being used as a tool to win votes, especially by Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki who has publicly embraced the bans. This is a polarizing trend, with Sunnis feeling targeted since they are often associated with the Baath party. The Baathist past has become so politicized that the need for accountability, truth and reconciliation has been forgotten.

The impact of this on Iraq ripped to the surface most recently on January 25, when the first of several bomb attacks hit Baghdad on the same day as the execution of ‘Chemical Ali’, or Ali Hassan Al-Majid, a close associate of Saddam’s who had been convicted of involvement in the mass killings of the 1980s Anfal campaign. Most commentators have assumed that the attacks were carried out by supporters of Majid – Baathist leaders persist, even in death, to cause destruction in Iraq.

A truth and reconciliation commission could help to soothe the anger that is being so dangerously manifested. The US administration drew up plans for such a commission in 2003, but the plan was quietly abandoned. Again in 2006, Prime Minister Maliki announced a national reconciliation program, including an amnesty for insurgents who had not targeted civilians and a reversal of a law prohibiting Baathists from low level public positions. But public distrust and a lack of political will prevented the plan from becoming reality.

The post election period might be the time to resurrect the idea. Unlike the trial of Saddam, an Iraqi truth and reconciliation commission would need to be based on testament by both perpetrators and victims – on witnessing and accountability. A 2007 survey found that 95% of Sunnis and 38% of Shias in Iraq thought Saddam’s execution would not help reconciliation in the country – the quick justice of the executioner is not enough to make up for decades of fear.
A commission would also need to be widely trusted as impartial. The Accountability and Justice Commission, a closed body with no public participation, has been accused of being politically influenced, and may have contributed to recrimination and polarization rather than mitigating them.

Finally, a commission should take into account both pre- and post-2003 abuses - for instance the 2006 bombing of the Al Ashariya mosque in Samarra, an important Shia site - to avoid becoming yet another forum for anti-Baath cheap talk.

The plan need not fail again. President Jalal Talabani, although one of many Kurds who suffered at the hands of the Baathists, has opposed wholesale de-Baathification and may well favour a more conciliatory approach. And Iraqi culture places high value on narrative and testimony – according to Miranda Sissons of the US-based International Center for Transitional Justice, “the idea of standing up and witnessing is incredibly appealing” to Iraqis.

In his evidence to the Iraq War Enquiry, Tony Blair presented the 2003 invasion as an opportunity to remove an old foe which was grasped with both hands. After the upcoming election, the Iraqi government should take the opportunity to draw a line under that approach and begin a real process of healing. An Iraqi truth and reconciliation commission would be of great help in letting Iraq finally move on.

Lisbon Treaty: Hard lessons and new opportunities

2009-10-28T15:08:00.002Z

by Chris Ostrowski

We are at last about to draw a line under the ‘Lisbon saga’ that has overshadowed the EU for the past seven years. When Tony Blair promised a referendum on the old European Constitution in April 2004 he created a “referendum repository” in Britain that was filled with every conceivable anti-European argument. Debates about the internal structures of the EU were mangled with wild claims about immigration; arguments about the Euro were complimented by frenzied rhetoric about a super-state and a European army – all these claims were given cover by those who rightly cried: “You promised us a referendum”. Those of us that believe that we need a strong outward looking Europe, and more and better internationalism, have been stuck behind this repository. So now is the time to seize the opportunity to make the positive case for the EU and learn the lessons of the past seven years.

The two biggest lessons to be taken from this is not to produce a constitution which is so far reaching, inward looking and esoteric that the people give it a big raspberry (as happened in the European constitution); and not to promise a referendum on an issue that need to be discussed as part of the mainstream of political debate.

How right was Chris Patten when he heard of the Prime Minister’s promise to hold a referendum: “They [referendums] undermine Westminster……if you have a referendum on an issue politicians, during an election campaign say oh we're not going to talk about that, we don't need to talk about that, that's all for the referendum. So during the last election campaign [2001], the Euro was hardly debated. I think referendums are fundamentally anti-democratic…”

For those of us who believe that the enactment of the Lisbon treaty is well overdue and that it should not be put to a referendum there are two points that are worth making for just one final time: it is inconsistent to be against the Lisbon Treaty and in favour of enlargement – as the Lisbon Treaty is the enlargement treaty (take note the Conservative Party). A political party can’t claim to be acting in the interest of British parliamentary democracy if it wants a treaty to be put to a referendum (take note UKIP and the Conservatives) as the right to negotiate and agree treaties is earned by whichever party wins a general election to form a government. But these arguments - which never cut the mustard, and were only half heartedly made - will no longer be part of the debate.

As we leave the referendum repository and all its corrosive arguments behind, the political parties have the opportunity to make an election issue out of what sort of role we want Britain to play in Europe and what sort of role we want Europe to play in 21st century.

If voters can link the promises made in election manifestos with their actions on the international stage (particularly within the EU itself) then there are plenty of dividing lines that are ripe for a general election campaign. For example, if reducing carbon emissions and tackling climate change is in the Conservative Party’s manifesto then it is essential they answer how they will able to achieve this if they do not have the influence of all the related legislation that passes through the European Parliament.

Though there is still little widespread enthusiasm for the EU itself in Britain there is growing recognition amongst the electorate that issues have to be addressed internationally. So it’s not just on the issue of climate change where the Conservatives are vulnerable. We can not protect Britain from terrorism by acting alone; and most importantly - where this is now best understood - the health of our economy can not be preserved by our acting alone.

The challenge has always been how to illustrate that EU is responsible for some popular successes and more crucially how to show voters that if we had a Eurosceptic government then the consequences would be damaging to the British interest.

Two factors could help the government here. Firstly, and the difficulties involved in this can not be underestimated, it would be of great benefit if Government Ministers were to take the time and initiative to praise the EU and other member states individually when there is a success. It has always been the way that ministers blame ‘Brussels’ when something goes wrong and take the praise for the government when something is a success. But because we are faced with a Eurosceptic party which might form a government for the first time the risk of ‘losing’ a success to Brussels is actually diminished if the case is properly made.

For example if Ed Miliband returns from Copenhagen in December with a report on what has been achieved it would be a perfect opportunity to show how cooperation with the other EU member states and more specifically the action to be taken at EU level will contribute towards a climate change agreement. When Peter Mandelson engages with the European Commission on manufacturing it would be an opportunity to say. “We kept this plant open because of the way we worked with the EU and because of the influence we have – if we did not have such influence then British jobs would have been lost”. Rhetoric which praises the EU and incorporates ‘British interest’ story would help make the case for the EU and make the Conservatives open to attack on their European policy, and there are many opportunities: capping bonuses, closing European tax loopholes, stopping people trafficking and preventing ships carrying goods bound for Britain being hi-jacked. In all these areas there are likely to be positive developments over the next few months because of action taken at EU level but it will be up to individual ministers whether they take the opportunity to show the value of a positive relationship with the EU.

Secondly, the appointment of a permanent president of the Council is a moment that has rightly been seized by the Foreign Secretary to lay out the choice for Britain in 21st Century. A British office holder in one of the two key positions would be a tremendous boon for pro-Europeans in Britain today. Whether it Tony Blair as President of the Council, David Miliband, Paddy Ashdown or Chris Patten as the Representative on Foreign Affairs, it would reinforce how a strong Europe is in Britain’s interest. Again the Conservatives are vulnerable – while the Lib Dems and Labour have put forward candidates of the highest calibre, the Conservatives have attacked both the position and all potential candidates from anywhere. If a British official is chosen then the time between their appointment and the general election can then be used to show how the Conservatives refusal to support the office holder was damaging to the national interest and an attempt to reduce Britain’s influence in the EU and on the world stage.

Chris Ostrowski was Labour’s Candidate in the Norwich North By-election and a candidate for the East of England in the 2009 European Parliament Election

‘Reconnecting the European Parliament and its people’

2009-10-20T14:41:00.000+01:00

The Foreign Policy Centre wants to know your views about the European Parliament. It will shortly be launching a project with the European Commission that will examine public awareness and attitudes towards the European Parliament, assess the problems that it faces and explore some possible remedies (including reform of the electoral system used for European Parliament elections and enhancing national and local parliamentary engagement and scrutiny). We want to get your views on what the key problems are for getting the public engaged with the European Parliament and what reforms are necessary, so let us know either on here on the blog or by email to adam[dot]hug[at]fpc[dot]co[dot]uk.

FPC at Party Conferences: Have your say

2009-09-24T08:42:00.002+01:00

If you attended any of the Fringe events at Liberal Democrat Conference or are attending any of our events at Labour and Conservatives please let us know your thoughts on the debates. Tell us what you agreed with, disagreed with or wanted to know more about. Share your thoughts on the FPC Blog.

Extrajudicial attacks on opposition activists belie Saakshvili’s commitment to democracy

2009-08-08T17:03:00.001+01:00

By Carl Thomson

This post is part of the FPC's ongoing Spotlight on Georgia project that seeks to gather different view points on human rights and democracy in Georgia.

While the world’s attention was distracted by events in Iran, another country with a record of human rights abuses and rigged elections sent in the riot police to beat and arrest democracy protestors. Masked policemen attacked dozens of demonstrators in Georgia early in the summer as they held a rally calling for the release of six opposition activists who had been detained on charges of spying for Russia. The police arrested 39 demonstrators and warned of further reprisals should the protests that have swept the Georgian capital in recent months continue.

The violence has followed similar attacks against opponents of Mikheil Saakashvili over the last few months. Other critics of the Georgian president have been arrested or found their families on the receiving end of state harassment. A recent report by the Organisation for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights into last year’s parliamentary elections in Georgia found “widespread and significant” irregularities, including ballot-box stuffing, the kidnapping and beating of opposition activists, biased news coverage from the state media, and government officials campaigning openly for Saakashvili’s United National Movement.
A common refrain used to justify this repression is that the opposition is working in league with Russia to foment a coup. The crackdown on Georgia’s independent media, which has seen television stations that carry reports critical of the president shut down or nationalised, has likewise been justified on the basis that Georgia does not have a “culture of democracy” to support a free press. This is a far cry from what we were told last autumn, when popular opinion held that the war between Russia and Georgia was nothing more than an attempt by the Kremlin to snuff out a fledgling democracy on Russia’s borders.

It is now apparent that Saakashvili has interpreted the sympathy he garnered in the aftermath of last year’s conflict and the growing concern over Russia’s intentions towards her neighbours as a green light to tighten his grip on power, rather than strengthen Georgia’s democratic institutions. At the beginning of August, a supporter of Burdzhanadze’s Democratic Movement for a United Georgia was kidnapped by men dressed in military uniform, assaulted and threatened with execution. A number of other party members were arrested that same weekend. The most serious incident involved Amiran Bitsadze, a refugee from Abkhazia, who was hospitalised after his assailants dragged him from his vehicle, shot him with rubber bullets, broke his leg and ran over him his arm. According to Burdzhanadze’s supporters, one of the men who attacked Bitsadze drove a car belonging to Georgia’s Special Operations Department.
Of course, democracy is a spectrum and Georgia is far away from other post-Soviet republics like Belarus or Tajikistan both in terms of the rights available to individual citizens and its integration into the international community. We know enough, however, to realise that we should no longer view Saakashvili’s Georgia through rose-tinted glasses. While Saakashvili talks the talk on subjects like human rights and dialogue with the opposition, the ongoing assault on Georgia’s independent media – Freedom House has again ranked Georgia down in terms of press freedom – along with the extrajudicial attacks on opposition activists belie his spoken commitment to democracy.

One year after war broke out in South Ossetia, the Conservative shadow defence secretary Liam Fox called on British politicians to show their support for the people of Georgia. Much of the world accepted Saakashvili’s version of events into how the war started, but many are now asking whether we can trust the word of a regime which is showing itself increasingly detached from Western standards of behaviour. If we really wish to see democracy flourish in Georgia, then our support would be best demonstrated by asking Saakashvili why the West still feels obliged to accept his opponents as political refugees.

Carl Thomson is a commentator on Russian and East European affairs and was the Conservative Party’s candidate for Glasgow East at the 2005 General Election.

Time to put Europe back on the map

2009-07-23T10:03:00.000+01:00

As the recession bites, the demands for more economic nationalism, protectionism and restrictions on immigration have grown in Europe, but the pro-European camp in the UK needs to find its voice again, writes Adam Hug for Public Servant.

(N.B this article was written in mid-June but published late July at http://www.publicservice.co.uk/feature_story.asp?id=12331)

Amid all the hoopla of cabinet resignations, alleged plots and general infighting that threatened to unseat Gordon Brown, the actual results of the European Elections somehow seemed something of an afterthought. The lowest share of the vote for the Labour Party since Keir Hardy was in short trousers was duly noted alongside real anger, though not surprise, at the election of BNP MEPs for the first time. What the result means for the UK's relationship with Europe has been mostly overlooked in the commentary.

The election campaign by the main parties was perhaps most notable for its almost complete lack of European content with occasional Conservative attacks on the government's decision not to hold a referendum on the Lisbon treaty the only issue gaining significant coverage. John Prescott, not the most devout of pro-Europeans, was stinging in his attack on the government's 'non-campaign' saying it lacked a clear message. The retreat from making a positive case for Europe by the Labour Party, although perhaps for tactical reasons at this election, is part of a longer term trend that leaves the way open for a strategic defeat for pro-Europeans at the hands of Eurosceptic media and parties.

Even before the first vote was counted the Conservatives' decision to leave the EPP-ED to create a new Eurosceptic group 'European Conservatives and Reformists' meant it was always likely that Britain's delegation for the first time would have a clear majority of MEPs (43 MEPs) sitting in explicitly Eurosceptic groupings in the Parliament. The actual result gave the Eurosceptic camp 43 members and with 29 UK MEPs remaining in the main groupings or smaller pro-European coalitions. The Tories move from the EPP is likely to preclude them from gaining high ranking positions in the Parliament's Committees, reducing their ability to directly influence legislation. When the poor result for Labour and the PES across Europe that reduced their bargaining power for committee posts is taken into account it is clear that the UK will have considerably less clout in the new Parliament than it has previously been able to exercise.
While the corrosive effect of the drip drip revelations on MPs expenses clearly helped to depress both the turnout and support for the main three parties, the scandal simply added to an anti-establishment sentiment seen in several European Countries. In Western Europe the hard right strengthened its position in some countries including the Freedom Party in the Netherlands led by recently banned from the UK Geert Wilders, the True Finns Party in Finland and the Freedom Party in Austria. On a more positive note the Front National fell back in France from 7 to 3 seats while the German far right failed to make a breakthrough.

The trend was perhaps most pronounced in Eastern Europe, where the economic crisis hit hardest, seeing a significant rise in support for anti-EU parties and large falls in turnout in many countries, amid complaints that the EU is not doing enough to assist them. Among them include the anti-Roma Hungarian nationalist JOBBIK party achieved 3 MEPs and 14.8 per cent of the vote, while the Greater Romanian Party whose pet hates include ethnic Hungarians will join them in Brussels after also gaining 3 seats.

While commentators have pointed out that the elections were a bad day for Europe's Centre-Left, looking at the relative successes and failures it seems that the overall trend in the election may be seen as a setback for openness and internationalism rather than a post-crunch endorsement of free market values in the face of a socialist critique. The election saw call for greater economic nationalism, protectionism, restrictions on immigration and opposition to Turkish accession grow louder. However for the most part the parties of the right were able to respond to the economic crisis by co-opt the criticisms of 'Anglo-Saxon' capitalism, arguing that they had always preferred a more continental capitalism with an activist, regulating state.
The challenge across Europe is to reverse this nationalist, insular trend while holding a measured debate about the EU's future economic direction. However here in the UK there is a pressing need for pro-Europeans to start making the case about why we benefit from EU membership and the damage a diminished relationship with other European partners or withdrawal would do to Britain.

The pro-European camp in the UK has been without a focus for several years lacking an issue such as Euro membership to unite behind and since the decline of the 'Britain in Europe' campaign. There is a clear need to re-establish a broad based coalition in favour of the European Union, not for any new grand projet, but to reassert the importance of the European Union for the UK's long-term economic prosperity and its status as a key player on the world stage. Politicians of all parties, business, trade unions, NGOs and grass roots activists must unite to make the case that only by working together with our European partners can we effectively address the cross-border challenges we face such as climate change and repairing the global economy.

Can Syria end the Arab cold war?

2009-07-14T12:56:00.001+01:00

Chris Phillips (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jul/14/syria-saudia-arabia-cold-war)

One by one the diplomats are returning to Damascus. In the wake of Barack Obama's decision to appoint a new ambassador to Syria, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has followed suit. However, a new Saudi ambassador represents more than a mirroring of western rapprochement with the Ba'athist regime – it is an olive branch between two states that have been locked in opposition for the last four years.

While Washington seemingly steps up its attempts to woo President Bashar al-Assad away from Iran, Saudi Arabia is working in conjunction to lure him into the so-called moderate Arab camp. With King Abdullah himself expected to visit Syria soon, could this ambassadorial appointment mark the first step in ending the latest round of the Arab cold war?

Malcolm Kerr described the 1950s and 1960s in the Middle East as an "Arab cold war" pitting Nasser's Egypt and allies against conservative Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Though the actors and ideologies have changed, some form of cold war in the Arab world has remained ever since, whether Cairo's temporary exclusion after making peace with Israel in 1979, or Syrian-Saudi-Egyptian collusion with the US against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991. Its latest embodiment is well known: Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas, under the patronage of Iran, face allies of the US in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. While verbal attacks have dominated, with the "moderates" stoking fears of a "Shia Crescent" challenging Arab Sunni hegemony and the "radicals" lambasting Egypt's inaction during the Gaza war, violence has erupted too, notably when Saudi and Syria's proxies fought gun battles in Beirut last year.

So why is Saudi, arguably the bitterest of Syria's Arab rivals, extending a hand to end this cold conflict now? Riyadh has three priorities that promote reconciliation with Damascus. Firstly, it wishes to contain Syria's close ally, Iran, and particularly fears its nuclear programme. The Sunday Times recently reported a green light from Riyadh for an Israeli attack on Iran through Saudi airspace. Though this has not been confirmed, it is fair to say Riyadh would shed no tears over an Israeli strike. However, it would fear a domestic backlash should Hezbollah and Syria retaliate against Israel, and prying Assad from Ahmadinejad's embrace seems the best way to avoid this. The uncertainty in Tehran following the recent post-election protests has catalysed Saudi's renewed effort to detach Syria from Iran.

Another key factor is Lebanon. Saudi has long backed Saad Hariri and his supporters in the "March 14" group who emerged victorious in June's elections. Yet despite their victory Syria's allies – Hezbollah and the "March 8" group – remain powerful and some kind of compromise is needed if a functioning government is to be formed in Lebanon. Having already tried and failed to neutralise the opposition by military force, when Saudi-backed Sunni militants were swiftly defeated by Shia gunmen in May 2008, Riyadh understands it must enter dialogue with Damascus to keep the peace with Hezbollah and consolidate Hariri's electoral victory.
The final and arguably greatest priority for Riyadh is to toe Washington's line. Under George Bush, when the US's tone was confrontational, Saudi was similarly demanding of Syria. In contrast, following Obama's less antagonistic approach, Saudi and other Arab allies are softening their stance. King Abdullah of Jordan, the inventor of the "Shia Crescent" theory, has been in Damascus recently trying to sell Obama's peace initiative to Assad. Egypt has similarly invited Syria to help moderate Palestinian reconciliation talks, while Saudi's new ambassadorial appointment is the latest of several gestures of reconciliation during 2009.

So will these measures win over Syria and end the latest Arab cold war? Ostensibly Damascus is weak and in need of allies: Hezbollah is still reeling from electoral defeat and Iran is subdued domestically and isolated internationally. Moreover, US sanctions are starting to have an impact on the Syrian economy, and Obama's support is crucial if the long-occupied Golan Heights are to be recovered. Surely ditching Iran and embracing the Arab moderates is the best way to ensure the dual goals of economic development and returning territory?

Yet from a position of seeming weakness Assad is proving to be increasingly shrewd in foreign relations. He has turned the Lebanese defeat to his advantage by emphasising Syria's lack of interference – something that has won plaudits from the French president Nicolas Sarkozy among others. Similarly, a recent interview on western television has helped his British-born wife Asma present a more positive view of the country. Yet, at the same time as promoting western and Arab rapprochement, Assad has shored up the Iranian alliance by being the first leader to congratulate Ahmadinejad on his re-election.

Contrary to American and Saudi wishful thinking, it is the Iranian alliance that has given Syria its regional importance and allowed it to confront the moderate Arab states despite military and economic weakness. Assad has spoken of a desire to be the bridge or back-channel for the west to Tehran – and for this he needs to retain the alliance, not abandon it in some grand bargain for diplomatic realignment and economic investment. While his strategy of playing both sides to maximise gains for Syria might include welcoming Saudi's advances, this won't permanently end the latest Arab cold war and may ultimately make it slightly colder.

Time to take Sharia in Pakistan more seriously?

2009-07-13T19:31:00.001+01:00

Ella Rolfe

Swat residents have my sympathy if they are skeptical at the Pakistan Army’s announcement of imminent victory there. No post-conflict plan has been outlined; Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid recently said people are afraid the government will strike another deal with the Taliban.March’s ceasefire deal, giving effective judicial power to sharia courts in line with Taliban demands, excited much chatter. Was the Pakistani government so weak that it would risk international opprobrium? Or trying to move away from the American-sponsored Musharraf era? Some detected the nudging hand of the ISI, the secret service notorious for undermining the government to empower its client militias.

What many missed, though, is that sharia law was only a small part of the story. Partial sharia already operated over parts of northern Pakistan, including Swat - brought in by the dictator Ziaul Haq in the 1980s and never lifted. The recent deal therefore represented an expansion of powers – certainly not an ideological or systemic shift.

Sharia itself is not behind people’s fears. Popular relief at the deal did not necessarily express a pro-sharia groundswell – only 3% of votes in the 2008 elections went to parties advocating it – but people welcomed an end to fighting, and many found the new sharia courts quicker and cheaper than state courts.

But relief quickly evaporated as the army left Swat and the Taliban’s grip on judicial systems returned. The resulting lack of rule of law explains the fear now - not of sharia but of chaos. Emboldened not by an ideological underpinning to their dominance but by the withdrawal of the only effective opposition, the Taliban seek not true sharia but pure power - and they got it with the last deal.

With the renewed army operation, the government can’t claim that the deal was likely to bring reconciliation. Soon after the ceasefire there were several skirmishes involving insurgents loyal to Mullah Fazlullah, a Taliban commander whose father-in-law, Pakistani Taliban leader Maulana Sufi Muhammad, had signed the deal. Although the government may have had little choice of broker, their mistake was to trust too much in Sufi Muhammad’s authority over Fazlullah.

As another ceasefire looms, crucial questions remain unanswered. Where are the results of the army operation? Who has been killed or battered into submission, and who brought into agreement; what is different this time? There is widespread suspicion that after the army’s withdrawal the area will revert to de facto Taliban control, proving the military operation worthless. Is this really all 60% of Pakistan’s budget can achieve?

The collapse of the previous deal may or may not exemplify the government’s incompetence (let’s not forget the scale of the problems), but it does show the emphasis on high-level political deal making which consumes so much of its time. Pakistan, a society so status-ridden it makes Victorian Britain look like Big Brother, suffers particularly acutely from this. As in Numeri’s Sudan in 1983, sharia law has been used by the top to squeeze support from an opposing faction. Ideology has never mattered less: had the Taliban demanded that their role in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan be justified by compulsory pink ra-ra skirts, the government would most likely have complied.

The cynical use of sharia shows deep confusion in Pakistan’s identity, starting with the use of Islam by a supposedly secular state as the primary reason for its existence. As such, Islamic law has been sporadically and arbitrarily thrown into a mish-mash of hangovers in Pakistani law, including the still-used Frontier Crimes Regulation introduced by the British in 1901. The largely secular elite seems to think that the people need occasional tidbits of Islamic rule to prevent them revolting while it carries on its game of high-level musical chairs. While a small minority with AK47s is talking to a small minority with an electoral mandate, everyone else has been sold short.

The preponderance of power politics means that rulers of Pakistan seem to exist to posture rather than to govern. After the Mumbai bombings, in the context of various border skits, warlike press statements by both governments and an infuriatingly pointless press debate over whether or not the surviving bomber was Pakistani, the Swat deal was struck just as most of the army was redeployed to the Indian border. The ceasefire was not brokered with the local situation foremost in mind.

The Swat deal may also have been an attempt to distract attention from the anti-government lawyers’ movement - one that grew ever more ridiculous as the removal from office of the movement’s champions the Sharif brothers in late March enflamed it further. Amid threats of revolution and the deployment of container blockades on all roads into Islamabad, the government announced that the national kite-flying festival, Basant, would be held the same day as the lawyers’ march into the capital. Basant should have happened in February, when it was fairly successfully banned by the government because of the lethal habit of covering kite strings with broken glass to cut down rivals’ kites.

So anything the government does now in Swat will be deeply distrusted, and probably too myopic to make any difference. As Ahmed Rashid said, the army is not fulfilling its duty to protect civilians in Swat by simply telling them to leave before it bombs their houses. Civilians are being treated as inconvenient dust on the agenda of defeating whichever ‘enemy’ best serves the maintenance of power today. This means not only that the army has the wrong mentality and the wrong type of warfare to defuse the Taliban, but also that it doesn’t seem to care.Because of this, sharia law - or indeed any real reform - is inconsistently implemented and barely integrated, and the government is not taking responsibility for oversight. This hands-off, high-political rather than legal approach is the root of the government’s troubles. If it took sharia more seriously, as law rather than bargaining chip, and integrated sharia into an accountable and functioning legal system, it might manage to dent the Taliban’s power.

Can Syria be internationally rehabilitated without negotiations with Israel?

2009-07-08T12:59:00.000+01:00

Chris Phillips. Source: The Majalla

Until very recently, the political climate regarding Syria's relationships with Israel, US and the West improved considerably, and an agreement on the Golan Heights issue seemed likely. However, elections in Israel changed the whole rationale, and the main question now seems to be whether the West-Syria rapproachement is possible, without negotiations and the improvement of relations with Israel.

The view from Damascus has improved recently. The twilight years of the Bush administration saw European and American politicians gradually end the White House's diplomatic boycott to court President al-Asad. At the same time, indirect negotiations with the departing Israeli government of Ehud Olmert signalled that peace talks with Tel Aviv could soon be revived. Finally, on assuming power in January, Barack Obama spoke of engaging with pariah states and indicated a desire to promote a regional multi-lateral peace, perhaps in the shape of the 2002 Arab peace initiative. There were whispers in Damascus that a reengagement with the US and peace talks with Israel were a real possibility.

Unfortunately, the Israeli electorate did not read the script. The right-wing government of Benjamin Netanyahu elected in February, though stating its willingness to negotiate with Syria, has already ruled out returning the Golan Heights - Asad's precondition for talks. The Syrian President has long wanted to tie any Israeli talks with a renewed engagement with the US, and waited for a compliant US administration to mediate peace negotiations. However, with Asad now facing an uncompromising partner in Tel Aviv and President Obama already showing more contempt for Israeli procrastination and inaction than his predecessors, this article considers how the Syrian-US-Israeli triangular relationship is changing and the consequences for peace negotiations.

Syria's relevance to US Middle East policy since 9/11 has been curiously paradoxical, becoming both weaker and more important. Ostensibly, the Ba'ath regime has less regional power under Bashar than under his father, Hafez al-Asad. The armed forces have continued to decline following the collapse of their Soviet sponsor and are no longer anywhere near the 'strategic parity' with Israel that Hafez once dreamed of - a position emphasised by Israel's unchallenged recent air raids deep into Syrian territory. Internationally, Syria was forced out of Lebanon in 2005 and has only recently circumnavigated the subsequent diplomatic boycott from Western powers. Financially, market reforms have been limited and, aided by US sanctions, the economy has developed sluggishly.

Yet in its relative isolation, Syria has found new levers to ensure it remains too great an irritation for Washington to ignore - a situation compounded by America's increased involvement in the region. Now that containing Iran has emerged as a US priority, Damascus' three-decade-long alliance with Tehran has become a useful bargaining chip for Asad. As Obama tries to stabilise and exit the Iraq quagmire, the extent to which Syria tightens its border to prevent the passage of insurgents has become another lever of negotiation. The degree of intervention in Lebanese politics since the 2005 withdrawal has similarly emerged as a bone of contention with Washington. Whilst continuing to press for an end to Syrian support of Hamas and Hezbollah remains a priority, Obama finds himself needing to engage with Damascus on a myriad of issues away from the exclusively Israeli track.

The shift in the international climate has prompted a change in priorities in Damascus as well. Whilst the return of Golan and the need for a 'just peace' with Israel remain a fundamental concern for the regime, immediate worries are economic. A limited embrace of the free market has failed to counter the impact on Syria's economy of either the present economic crisis or US imposed sanctions. Whilst the orthodox view in Damascus has previously been that a peace with Israel would eventually bring an economic windfall from the US - though more in terms of investment than Jordan and Egypt's direct aid - regime figures are now suggesting immediate capital with or without an Israeli peace is essential. Deputy Prime Minister and economic planner Abdullah Dardari recently admitted in an interview to Reuters that sanctions were having an impact and that the economy was not growing at the anticipated rate. With almost 20% unemployment, a bloated inefficient bureaucracy, and decaying infrastructure, Syrian policy planners seem now to recognise that mending ties with the US and the investment and ending of sanctions that comes with it, is of greater priority than negotiating with Tel Aviv.

Conversely, were Damascus able to secure US goodwill in the short term without negotiating with Tel Aviv, it might suit the regime domestically. Whilst the return of the Golan Heights will never cease to be a priority for the government, its continued absence provides an excuse to maintain authoritarian rule. The 'war' with Israel is used to justify the continued state of Emergency since 1963, the suspension of the rule of law and the delay in Bashar's promised political liberalisation. Having promised 'bread before freedom' on coming to power in 2000, if US rapprochement and investment can secure greater material wealth, the status quo with Israel might prove a useful way of avoiding calls for domestic reform.

Much hangs on the approach taken by the new White House. Though Washington recently extended sanctions on Damascus for a further year, much to the dismay of pro-Obama figures such as Dardari, diplomatic contact is becoming more regular. Hillary Clinton and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair John Kerry have made several recent phone calls to Damascus, and Special Envoy George Mitchell is rumoured to be visiting soon. At the same time, whilst the administration seems more willing to force Tel Aviv into action than past US governments, pressure thus far seems to be limited to settlements and engaging with the Palestinians rather than the Syrians.

In the Syrians' favour it seems that the administration is willing to renew contact and enter dialogue with Damascus without relating it to a renewal of talks with Israel. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the strong anti-Syrian pro-Israeli voices on Capitol Hill will allow sanctions to end without linking it to peace talks with Tel Aviv. Obama might be willing to overrule such critics and fully restore economic and diplomatic ties with Damascus anyway. Alternatively, he might adopt the same strong-arm approach to pressure Israel into negotiations with Syria as he seems to be adopting with their settlements in the West Bank. Yet to do so he will want something in return. Syria has successfully acquired a decent arsenal of bargaining chips with Washington in recent years. If negotiations are to progress with either Israel or the US, it needs to start playing them.

The Baha’is reply to Ayatollah Najafabadi

2009-03-27T17:55:00.004Z

Geoffery Cameron is a Foreign Policy Centre Research Associate and writes here in a personal capacity as a member of the Baha'i Community. This was first posted on his blog Jeune Street.

On February 11th, Iran’s Deputy Prosecutor-General announced charges against seven detained Baha’i leaders, which included “espionage for Israel, desecrating religious sanctities and propaganda against the Islamic Republic.” The charges were made almost a year after the arbitrary detention of the seven, who were not permitted to see their families for months and have still not been provided access to a lawyer.

The Baha’i International Community has just sent a remarkable public reply to Ayatollah Najafabadi, systematically refuting claims that the Baha’i leaders or the community have transgressed the law.

What does the letter say?

The letter speaks truth to power. In a tone both polite and direct, it reviews the history of the persecution of the Baha’is in Iran before addressing the charges made against the seven Baha’is. The letter reiterates basic Baha’is beliefs and the record of the Baha’i community — both well known to the authorities in Iran — in the context of the charges:

In whatever country they reside, Bahá’ís strive to promote the welfare of society. They are enjoined to work alongside their compatriots in fostering fellowship and unity and in establishing peace and justice. They seek to uphold their own rights, as well as the rights of others, through whatever legal means are available to them, conducting themselves at all times with honesty and integrity. They eschew conflict and dissension. They avoid contest for worldly power.

The letter closes with a moving challenge to the Prosecutor General, to justify the accusations that the Baha’is are “manipulative” and “deceitful,” “dangerous” and “threatening” as more than blind prejudice:

Do you consider dangerous the efforts of a group of young people who, out of a sense of obligation to their fellow citizens, work with youngsters from families of little means to improve their mathematics and language skills and to develop their abilities to play a constructive part in the progress of their nation?

Is it a threat to society for Bahá’ís to discuss with their neighbors noble and high-minded ideals, reinforcing the conviction that the betterment of the world is to be achieved through pure and goodly deeds and through commendable and seemly conduct?

In what way is it manipulative for a couple to speak in the privacy of their home with a few friends confused by the portrayal of Bahá’ís in the mass media and to share with them the true nature of their beliefs, which revolve around such fundamental verities as the oneness of God and the oneness of humankind?

The letter calls for fairness in the judiciary’s treatment of the detained Baha’i leaders, “for the sanctity of Islam and the honour of Iran.”

Noteworthy aspects of the letter

Several aspects of the letter are worth noting:

1. It places the case of the Baha’is within the context of more general issues of law and governance in Iran. Najafabadi has justified the detention of the Baha’is on the grounds that basic freedoms outlined in the Constitution may be proscribed at the will of the government. This arbitrary approach to the application of law has implications for other persecuted groups in Iran by raising questions about the very integrity and fairness of the legal system. The case is fundamentally about the freedom of conscience in Iran, and its outcome will have implications far beyond the Baha’i community.

2. It notes that the government has been fully informed of the activities of the Baha’i community since the administration was banned in 1983. The sudden arrest and detention of the seven Baha’i leaders on the grounds that they were conducting secretive or illegal activities are, in this context, absurd. Those in government making slanderous accusations against the Baha’is have full knowledge of the beliefs and practices of the Baha’i community, which bear no relationship with claims that they are ‘dangerous’, ‘threatening’ or ‘manipulative’.

3. It repeatedly praises the Iranian people, drawing attention to the courage and commitment to justice shown by those who have stood in solidarity with their Baha’i peers and colleagues. The Iranian government has tacitly encouraged the informal Baha’i leadership in its activities in the past, such that they were said to protect the Baha’i community from a prejudiced and violent population. The letter responds by saying “our vision of the Iranian people does not correspond with the one projected by such officials.”

A bellwether for Iran

The case of the Baha’i leaders in Iran is a bellwether for the direction to be taken by the Iranian government in the coming years. Recent signs of escalation in the persecution of Baha’is, the detention of student activists, and clamping down on women’s rights advocates are indications that Iran is descending into an unstable authoritarian regime. The government is increasingly out of sync with the wishes of its people, and force, coercion and mass deception are the tools of a regime unsure of its popular support.

If Iran is to reverse course and begin to re-build its position as a stable government and credible member of the international community, the first step will be to extend basic citizenship rights to all of its citizens. This course of action has been endorsed by several senior clerics, and such a step would be a move toward the country’s maturation into a universally respected nation.

Iran possesses a long history of diversity and tolerance of religious diversity. In a theocratic state such as Iran, the protection of the freedom to believe is a key benchmark for fairness and equity in governance.

The case of the detained Baha’i leaders is a test case for Iran. Let us hope that it chooses the path of justice.

Georgia …pro-Western country?

2009-03-12T20:16:00.002Z

Nino Zhgenti

The FPC will be showcasing a range of different views from commentators across the Georgian political spectrum as part of it's 'Spotlight on Georgia' project.

Since the Rose Revolution, Georgia has launched an active, pro-Western policy with the clear objectives of NATO and EU integration. Despite an active promotion of democratic principles within Georgia during the last five years, there is still a lot of debate about the honesty of these intentions. Georgia has been experiencing serious problems in a number of fields, with the Government continually introducing new policies, reforms and laws that naturally would not favour everyone. Whilst there has been a positive impact in some fields like education, opposition parties still complain about a corrupt judicial system. Moreover, looking through the last five-years of reforms and protests in Georgia, there seems to be an increasing sense of aggravation amongst the Georgian population. Naturally, this situation does not immediately suggest that the reforms and laws that were passed throughout this period have been moving in the wrong direction. However, the increasing discontent can be interpreted as the result of the Georgian Government’s lack of diplomacy towards its own public.

Lack of diplomacy has not only been visible in internal affairs, but also in Georgia’s foreign policy. There has been, for example, clear instances of unethical and at times insulting rhetoric directed at Russia which should be mentioned. Many Georgian officials have seized every opportunity to make threatening statements towards President Medvedev, Prime Minister Putin and the Russian Government. At first glance, it seems obvious that pro-Western Georgia, emboldened by the US support, was eager to rid of Russia’s influence as soon as possible. For these reasons, and in accordance with NATO and EU membership requirements, the goal was a peaceful resolution to the conflicts in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Unfortunately, what the world witnessed in South Ossetia (known to many Georgians as Samachablo region of Northern Georgia) was nothing approaching a peaceful resolution. In looking for the reasons and causes for this devastating war of August 2008, there are a variety of arguments that can and have been made. However, one thing is clear and that is that Russia’s attacks went far beyond the war zone as they bombed villages and strategic objectives that were a considerable distance from the immediate conflict zone.

In any case, it is quite obvious that despite its desire, Georgia will never be fully able to rid itself of Russian influence. Every country has its long-term goals and objectives in foreign policy, positioning its own state in a favourable way on the world stage. In planning for Russia’s future, the Russian Government definitely had, has and will have Georgia in mind. It is obvious that it is not so much about Georgia itself, but more about the games of world politics in which major actors like the US and Europe are involved and where small states like Georgia can only become subjects of interest when their strategic geographical locations are of immediate relevance. In other words, in comparison to the US who became interested in Georgia quite recently, Russia has always had political and economical calculations to make regarding the Caucasus region. Namely, one of those political calculations is the aforementioned policy regarding Georgia’s ambition to join NATO. If we look at a map of Russia’s western boundaries along the Baltic coast, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all are members of NATO. The only post-Soviet European countries which are not members of the military alliance are Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus. What makes matters even worse is that all of these states, except Belarus, are hoping for NATO membership. To many Russian politicians the tendency of NATO, which is at its heart a military organisation, toward integration of former Soviet countries might easily be interpreted as a threat to Russia.

Why does the US want NATO expansion? The first thing that might come to a Russian mind is that it could be to protect and to be used against Russia. However, at this point Europe is still partly dependent on its powerful neighbour for reasons such as energy, which means that it is difficult for certain NATO allies to be used against it. Obviously, this is a situation which Russia is keen to maintain. Apart from this, the fact that Georgia shares the border with a NATO member country, Turkey, might make Georgia even more desirable for its neighbour since in case of conflict with the US or other NATO member countries, it could provide a convenient place for strategic Russian military bases. As for economic interests, Georgia is at the juncture of Europe and Asia and naturally serves as a bridge between the North and East. It seems Russia is keen to benefit from this. There are Black Sea ports which might serve as potential routes for Russian controlled oil and gas pipelines. Furthermore, communications and pipelines linking Russia and Armenia run through Georgia. Hence, one would be naïve to think that Russia will be willing to give up Georgia so easily. So, was the whole Georgian policy towards Russia simply naivety, self-defence, miscalculation of the situation or the US initiation, it is hard to tell but it is clear that Russia seemed to achieve its goals.

In fact, Russia may well have benefited from the war in South Ossetia/Samachablo. Firstly, Georgia’s potential membership of NATO is postponed indefinitely. Secondly, Russia established its control over even more territories than those directly affected by conflict. Thirdly, the international community seems to view Georgia as the initiator of war, strengthening the Russian position. However, despite the critical perceptions of Georgia held by many in the West, politically, Russia still seems to have lost. Its actions on Georgian territory were interpreted as aggressive and disproportionate whilst international recognition of the breakaway regions was absent from everyone except Nicaragua. This should be alarming for Russia which is keen to occupy a respected and powerful position in World politics.

The extent of the potential conflict in the Georgian-Russian relationship is not limited to territorial disputes. Russia not only occupies Georgian territories but, according to Georgian media, it also exercises commercial influence over commodities such as water and electricity which are often controlled by companies with Russian ties. Moreover, appointing a Russian national as a Minister of Foreign Affairs after the August war caused further controversy in Georgian society. All this leads to the question: if the Russian Government is Georgia’s “enemy” and, as illustrated by the August conflict Russia has the power to achieve its goals, why is Russia being given even more power over Georgia?

From the current perspective, it seems that everything that happened in Georgia recently has made Russian control more stable and strong. Despite a hostile attitude between the leaders of the two countries at the time, there is every reason to assume that Russia might be comfortable with Saakashvili being in power. There is a difference between rhetoric and action and the events that have unfolded, whether completely intended or not, have for the meantime fulfilled Russia’s wishes with regard to Georgia.

The Battle for Serpent Island

2009-03-12T19:32:00.002Z

Alex Jackson

On February 3, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave its ruling on a long-running dispute between Romania and Ukraine over the delimitation of the Black Sea, and the oil and gas reserves that lie beneath it. The ruling, which although marketed as a compromise essentially favoured Romania, was intensely politicised in both countries. Indeed, it has already claimed one scalp in the form of Ukrainian Foreign Minister Volodymyr Ohryzko who was criticised for, inter alia, his poor handling of the Black Sea dispute.

The Background

The dispute originated after the Second World War, when Serpent Island, a 0.17 km²speck off the Danube delta, was omitted from the Paris peace treaties which reshuffled territory after the Axis collapse. The island was nominally under Bucharest’s control until 1949, when a technical document – not, it should be noted, an official treaty - on border delimitation ceded the island to Soviet control. This document did not, however, deal with the matters of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or the continental shelf around the island . Negotiations over the official maritime boundary continued until 1991, when the USSR’s place in the talks was taken by newly-independent Ukraine, with an intensive new delimitation process begun in 1998. The matter was finally taken to the ICJ in 2004.

The significance of Serpent Island lies in its status. If, as Kiev claimed, it was indeed an island, then Ukraine would control 370km of open sea around it. Since the island lies more or less parallel to the land boundary, this claim would have given Ukraine access deep into what Romania viewed as its waters. Romania claimed that Serpents Island was merely a rock, and thus was not a factor in maritime delimitation. Energy gave the dispute additional importance. The 12,000km² contested area is estimated to hold around 100 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas, and 10 million tons of oil equivalent – the dispute has so far prevented anything but tentative exploration of the deposits.

The Ruling

The sides disagreed on whether or not the 1949 document did delimit the maritime boundary around Serpent’s Island in a 12-mile arc, as claimed by Romania . This was significant, since in subsequent treaties (as recently as 2003) the two sides had agreed to accept previous demarcation documents and protocols. The ICJ ruled that the 1949 agreement, despite confusion in the original sketch maps, did support Romania’s case.

The crux of the matter, the relevance of Serpent’s Island to the formation of an EEZ and continental shelf entitlements, also went in Romania’s favour. The ICJ stated that whether or not it constituted a ‘rock’ or an ‘island’ was essentially irrelevant: the areas subject to delimitation were already within the EEZ and continental shelf generated by Ukraine’s mainland coasts, and so Serpent’s Island would be unable to add to them. Furthermore, since the southern edge of the area to be delimited had already been agreed upon, no entitlements arising from Serpent’s Island could have affected the southern line.

The ICJ assessed other relevant circumstances, such as pre-existing conduct (Ukraine claimed that its oil licensing and exploration activities – which were uncontested by Romania at the time – should be taken as a post facto justification of its claim) and security requirements, but found no reason to adjust the provisional boundary line which it had drawn up initially (see Map 1). The ruling gave Romania nearly 80% of the contested area .

The Implications

The ruling was greeted with understandable satisfaction in Bucharest, and the Romanian Prime Minister, Emil Boc, congratulated his foreign ministry on its efforts in the negotiations. Officials in Kiev were more downbeat, although they accepted the ruling as a ‘wise compromise’, although this did not stop the Deputy Foreign Minister expressing his frustration that the ICJ had disregarded Serpent’s Island . The Communist Party also demanded that the Prosecutor-General file charges of ‘high treason’ against relevant officials, including President Viktor Yuschenko. The angry response from nationalists, and the sacking of Foreign Minister Ohryzko, illustrates the current volatility of Ukraine’s politics.

The loss of oil and gas concessions will be a bitter blow for Kiev’s struggle to free itself of dependence on Russian gas. Relations between the two states soured after the Orange Revolution in 2004 brought a clutch of pro-Western politicians, including Mr. Yuschenko, to power. Ukraine’s moves towards the West, and particularly NATO, further angered Russian nationalists, for whom Ukraine is an integral, historic part of Russia. Relations hit a new low in January, when Moscow turned off the gas flow to Ukraine, officially for unpaid bills, but the highly visible role of Prime Minister Putin in the dispute clearly demonstrated the tangled nexus between business and politics. Without Black Sea gas deposits to develop – even if Kiev had the finances to do so, which is currently not the case – Ukraine will continue to rely on Russian gas.

For Bucharest, the decision constitutes a clear victory. Quite aside from the oil and gas deposits, which may be too deep to be financially viable with current energy prices, the ICJ ruling will be interpreted by the government as ‘a triumph for Romanian diplomacy’, in the words of Mr Boc. The ruling will help to increase Romania’s stock among EU diplomats sceptical of corruption and political deadlock. But perhaps such scepticism is warranted, after all: in the aftermath of the ICJ ruling, a scandal broke in Bucharest over the role of the previous administration in allegedly granting concession rights to a Canadian energy firm. Mr Boc has threatened to revoke the agreements, and the head of the natural resources agency, Bogdan Gabudeanu, has been sacked. The ICJ victory may just be the start of a new political fight.

Holding Iran to a higher standard

2009-02-13T16:32:00.002Z

by Geoffrey Cameron

The news from Iran seems to get worse every day.

Most recently, the regime announced that it will be trying seven Baha’is for “espionage for Israel, insulting religious sanctities and propaganda against the Islamic Republic.” It is presumed that the Baha’is being tried are the imprisoned group of leaders who were arrested and jailed in a raid last year. The spurious charges against this group are not new, and they represent the slippery application of law that passes for justice in Iran. As articles of faith, Baha’is honour Islam as a divine religion and are obedient to their government, and the presence of the Baha’i World Centre in Israel is an historical consequence of Baha’u'llah’s exile to Acre by the Persian and Ottoman Empires.

The legal process in Iran is so opaque that the facts in this case will be obscured if it ends up in court.

The charges against the Baha’i leaders are the latest in a series of escalating steps taking by the Iranian government to implement its official policy of “blocking the progress and development” of the Baha’i community. Most worryingly, lists of Baha’is have been drafted and circulated with the intention of monitoring members of the community. Dozens of Baha’is have been arbitrarily arrested and detained without charge, anti-Baha’i campaigns have been carried out by state media, Baha’i cemeteries have been destroyed, and Baha’i homes have been burned down. It is a chilling pattern of state-sponsored action.

Political backdrop

The political backdrop to all of this is the instability of the conservative power alignment in Iran. Power is concentrated within the hands of several dozen families, and more specifically within the hands of Ayatollah Khamenei; the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad simply reflects the broader rise of conservatives who espouse a rigid and narrow interpretation of Islam. The historical pattern in Iran (even under the Shah) has been that when the government is unstable or threatened it inflames deep-rooted anti-Baha’i prejudice to mobilize mass support. Recent discussion of Mohammad Khatami’s possible campaign for the presidency (and a broader challenge from reformists) is an indication that the government feels threatened.

The question of diplomacy

This all raises the question of how the international community — most specifically America — should respond to Iran. Diplomacy is urgently needed. Past relations with the US have been afflicted with a lack of trust, related to an underlying suspicion that the US does not accept the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic as Iran’s government. Saber rattling over the nuclear question can be seen in this context: the desire of the Islamic Republic for the world to accept its legitimacy. Iran gets attention every time a nuclear announcement is made — achieving the desired aim, to bolster its perceived standing in the community of nations.

Rather than ignoring the appalling human rights conditions in Iran, western states need to push a broader standard of state sovereignty — one that has been echoing in the halls of the United Nations. This is a notion that states have a sovereign responsibility to uphold the rights of their citizens. The world should not preach to Iran, but states should be clear that their respect for Iran depends upon its treatment of its people.

Upholding this standard requires constant pressure, but it also requires open dialogue and basic respect. Underlying this dialogue must be an acceptance that the Islamic Republic is a legitimate government, and that the respect for civil rights is fully compatible with Shi’a Islam. By negotiating within these terms, America and other nations will win allies within Iran and constrain the room for hostile factions to maneuver.

To start with, however, America and other states need to engage Iran on the treatment of the Baha’is.

The Forgotten Somalia: A Progressive Strategy

2009-02-05T12:27:00.003Z

By Rayhan Haque

Today, whenever people hear or think about international affairs, immediately what springs to mind is the recent war in Gaza, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Russia-Ukrainian energy crisis, and or Iran. There is absolutely no doubting that these issues are the most pressing and important concerns for the international community. It would be an affront to global institutions and notions of internationalism for these problems not to receive the highest priority and focus. However, one other issue that deserves parallel importance, is Somalia. This country is in a colossal state; riven by years of civil conflict and anarchy, radical Islamism and mass piracy have been left to breed and fester freely. With the recent withdrawal of the Ethiopian army, vast parts of the capital Mogadishu and the political centre, the town of Baidoa, have been captured by the radical al-Shabab Islamic militants. Whatever control the transitional federal government had, has now virtually evaporated. With an Ethiopian military return unlikely and the presence of only a weak African Union peacekeeping force, the al-Shabab militants hold over southern Somalia and key positions will grow stronger.

There may be some hope, as the UN brokered peace talks in Djibouti, agreed a new parliament including previous opposition forces, and elected a new President, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, from the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS). His job now will be to lead a new government and attempt to bring law and order to Somalia. That will not be an easy feat, as Somalia has not been a united country since 1991. This is a critical phase now, as anything short of success, may relegate Somalia into a full-blown civil war and territorial split. But the international community can play a vital role, and in particular, Britain, in ensuring that the transitional government have some means and capability of bringing peace to the country and fighting back the al-Shabab militants. This can be achieved through a 'soft interventionist' policy. Rather than sending British military forces, which would be as counter-productive as they are unfeasible, the British government should send a special military unit to train and build up the fragile Somalian army. A small international commitment of military aid, coupled with British army expertise and training, would allow the Somalian government to hire new recruits into the national armed forces.

There are several reasons why this would be an effective strategy. Firstly, it would ensure the deployment of national troops throughout the country. This is very important, as the opposition forces have been able to prosper by stoking and feeding off the national hostility that exists for foreign forces in Somalia. Prior to their departure, the presence of Ethiopian troops was incredibly unpopular in the country, so any further foreign military deployment would serve to only strengthen the hands of the radical Islamists. Funding and training the Somalian army would also weaken the profligacy of piracy currently taking place off the coastal waters. The allure of a stable, paid, and importantly, legal job would be an attractive option to many people who have entered the piracy world. And wi th their experience of weaponry and daring missions out in the sea's, the deserters could make effective soldiers. The third reason why this strategy should be adopted, is that there exists a regional precedent. The British army for the past few months, has been training and developing the Congolese national military forces, and if recent events are anything to go by, the strategy appears to be working. But the most important reason behind this approach, is that it would allow an overstretched British army to still engage effectively with far flung international crises that have major implications for the global community. The United States of America has a military base in nearby Djibouti and have already shown an interest in addressing the Somalian crisis. And with a new American administration, this emollient strategy for Somalia could be one of Barrack Obama's and Gordon Brown's first joint international operations to demonstrate to the world, the new progressive internationalism of the posh-Bush era.

Egypt & Gaza: A Troubled History

2009-01-21T15:21:00.000Z

By Mariam Ghorbannejad

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s announcement of a unilateral ceasefire in Gaza on January 18^th could not have come a day too soon. A 22-day campaign has witnessed the death of 1,250 Palestinians, an injury count reaching 5,500 and the killing of 13 Israelis. A humanitarian catastrophe has been halted.

In his address, Olmert said that Israel had achieved its targets; namely that Hamas’ military capabilities and infrastructure had been reduced and many of the tunnels used to transfer weapons into the coastal area had been destroyed.

A matter that in all probability helped bring about an end to the fighting was an agreement signed between Israel and its greatest ally, the United States the previous day. In the Memorandum of Understanding the American government pledged to take the necessary steps, alongside other members of the international community, to prevent the smuggling of weapons into Gaza. Without such an assurance, the Israeli operation could have continued into a fourth week.

The role of the Egyptians in securing peace in Gaza should not, however, be overlooked. An international conference on Gaza co-chaired by President Hosni Mubarak and his French counterpart Nicolas Sarkozy in the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Sharm El-Sheikh pressed parties concerned to consolidate the fragile ceasefire.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was in attendance, as was Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.

Earlier on Sunday, Hamas had agreed to a week-long ceasefire with Israel to allow it to withdraw its troops from Gaza. Telling, exiled deputy chief of the Islamic Resistance Movement Moussa Abou Marzouk had declared that the Palestinians: “are ready to cooperate with any efforts, especially those of the Egyptians, Turks, Syrians and Qataris, to reach an agreement that meets our known demands, which are a permanent lift of the blockade and the opening of all the crossing points, including the Rafah crossing.”

Egypt’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has often been at odds with other Arab countries. President Hosni Mubarak had claimed that Hamas invited attacks from Israel on the Gaza Strip when they failed to renew the six-month long ceasefire (brokered by Egypt) that expired in December 2008. This remark did not go down well with Arab leaders like President Bashar Assad of Syria who is staunchly against the Israeli military campaign. Another point of contention is Egypt’s support for Israel’s blockade of Gaza, which has also angered its own population.

Gaza provides a policy challenge for the Egyptians. Geographically, it is the only Middle East country besides Israel to share a border with the Gaza Strip, to the north-east. Its history of control of the Palestinian enclave, which it seized after Israel declared independence in 1948, staying until 1967, means that it is reluctant to be seen to be interfering in Palestinian affairs.

The signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1979 by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in exchange for Israeli forces withdrawing from Sinai drew widespread criticism in the Arab world. Relations have therefore been strained with Arab countries on the Palestinian issue ever since.

It could be argued that Egypt’s role in bringing about the ceasefire in the latest Gaza offensive has been pivotal. Israel is unwilling for direct talks with Hamas and the US Department of State has already branded the organisation ‘terrorist’ so a go-between who could engage with all parties was needed. Enter Egypt; one of the only Arab nations who are on friendly terms with Israel (next to Jordan), and a solution to end the fighting was forthcoming. Whether this ceasefire holds is yet to be determined.

What does Egypt have to gain by adhering to the Israeli blockade of Gaza?

Firstly and perhaps most importantly for the government, allowing Rafah to comply with the blockade effectively forces Israel into assuming humanitarian responsibility for the people of Gaza.

If Rafah were to be opened, Egypt would be burdened with an influx of Palestinians seeking work and needing housing, putting a strain on Egyptian finances. Israel could hold Egypt to account for any rocket attacks from Gaza. This would push the country into policing the porous border, a task fraught with difficulty. Stability in the region could be threatened by such a move.

One of the biggest fears of the Egyptian government is the close link that Hamas has with its own Muslim Brotherhood. The Islamic Resistance Movement look to the banned but tolerated opposition group in Cairo as their mentor. Similarly, the institutions of the Palestinian Authority, dominated by Fatah, are based on those of the Egyptian government. A caveat for the reopening of the crossing is that Hamas recognize the authority of the Palestinian Authority. Internal security threats in Egypt could be heightened if Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood collaborate.

Should the blockade be lifted, the Egyptian state risks the $1.4 billion-a-year aid package it receives from America. The US has put pressure on Egypt to maintain the blockade in the hope of causing submission of Hamas.

Gaza and Egypt’s history is intertwined and their future is likely to be shared. Palestinians, who come together in a unity government, will ultimately be in the strongest position to negotiate with Israel in realising a viable Palestinian state. Should this occur, Egypt’s role in patrolling the Gaza border will diminish along with the need for Palestinian resistance.

No more ‘internal issues’

2009-01-20T10:34:00.005Z

The vitriolic reaction in India to David Miliband’s comments in a recent Guardian article arguing that a political solution to the stalemate in Kashmir might be helpful in the fight against terrorism would suggest that the Foreign Secretary has touched a nerve. Some of the hysterical quotes in the Indian press accused Miliband of ‘appeasement of terrorism’ and playing ‘into the hands of those who are in denial and rationalise violent extremism by finding 'just' causes for it’, with a dig at ‘Whitehall's marginal status in international politics’ thrown in for good measure. Whether the Foreign Secretary’s intervention was wise or not given Britain’s colonial history in India remains to be seen; however what is immediately clear was that his analysis is broadly correct. To pretend that terrorism, particularly the traditional national state terrorism of territorial dispute and national identity focused on by Miliband’s article, can only be solved by military and paramilitary responses is the true exercise in denial.

India faces both a real and significant terrorist threat and a grave problem of Hindu nationalism which polarises relations with its own large Muslim minority and hampers efforts to find a solution to the challenges that have bedevilled Kashmir since partition. Similarly Pakistan’s decades long involvement with proxy organisations fighting for its ambitions in Kashmir that matched its behaviour towards groups in Afghanistan have helped make it the epicentre of the strategic crisis formerly known as the ‘war on terror’. Yet whatever can be said about the conflict in Kashmir is that its ripples have been felt well beyond the subcontinent, it is an internal issue that impacts from Srinagar to Salford.

The recent crisis in Gaza is a ready reminder that over many years we have seen similarly robust responses given by Israeli commentators to international discussion and criticism of its approach to Palestinian terrorism: ‘you don’t understand the situation’ and ‘this a fight for the security of our people’. Irrespective of rights and wrongs of the Israeli approach or the criticisms levelled against it, a decision taken in Jerusalem about how to deal with rockets from Gaza clearly impacts on security on the streets of London and of people across the world.

While anger and disaffection on the ground can be channelled locally into the mechanisms of nation state terrorism by any group of any faith with a grievance, we know that ‘internal issues’ across the world are banging the recruiting drum for transnational market state terrorism, as publically typified by Al-Qaeda and at present predominately amongst the Muslim community. It is clear that what happens in the hillsides of Kashmir and Helmand or the streets of Gaza and Baghdad does not only affect the combatants and those with the misfortune of living nearby, but that it can impact on us all. This is not to argue that conflicts across the globe cause terrorism in third countries but merely that it makes it easier for pre-existing networks to signup and mould already radicalised young men and sometimes women. The appropriate response combines the transformation of policing and military priorities of recent years and marries it to the political engagement and the common values articulated in Miliband’s article. There also must be a recognition from our own recent experience of terrorism at 7/7 that although the radicalisation of small sections of Britain’s Muslim youth began long before Afghanistan and Iraq, participation particularly in the latter has acted to widen the pool of young people receptive to co-option by extremists. This recognition must inform but not necessarily restrict our action at home or abroad, however it must ensure we redouble our efforts to find political solutions to challenges across the globe.

The Foreign Secretary has made an important attempt to remind people of the national roots of much of today’s terrorism and that this fact has been distorted by some of the rhetoric of the ‘War on Terror’, however we must resist the temptation flowing from this analysis towards parochial responses typified by the Indian media. David Miliband is right to raise the need to resolve the political disputes that encourage those on the ground to seek to resolve them through terrorism, however this not only for the sake of those directly involved but for us all. For while it is right to move beyond some of the language and methods of the War on Terror we must not forget that some of the terrorist threat across the world, particularly facing the West, is not drawn directly from nation state terrorism but that which feeds upon it and other conflict across the globe, from other countries ‘internal issues’.

When the dust settles in Gaza

2009-01-09T13:14:00.000Z

By Stephen Twigg and Adam Hug

With an aerial bombardment, Israeli troops on the streets of Gaza, a humanitarian crisis and frustrated diplomats, the parallels between the current crisis and the events of summer 2006 are pretty clear. That history has repeated itself with added ferocity and loss of life is testament to the diplomatic and political failure to which Israel, the Palestinians, the US, EU and neighbouring states have all been party. The bitter cycle of rocket attacks and economic blockade set against a backdrop of warring factions and glacial progress towards a final status agreement gives little credit all round.

The pressure from within the Israeli Government for mission creep to achieve the complete obliteration of Hamas appears to be subsiding as Egyptian and French diplomacy begins to make some progress, the scale of the humanitarian crisis and its global political impact becomes clearer to the Israelis and the task of finding suitable Hamas targets becomes progressively more difficult. As hopes of a possible resolution begin to flicker into view, thoughts are turning to what must be done to prevent this happening again.

Central to improving the situation in Gaza and across Palestine is the need for an agreement that enables Fatah and Hamas to find a working relationship. For while undoubtedly Hamas has been damaged as a military force in this operation, it remains a political organisation with the support of a significant minority of the Palestinian people with a legacy of its 2006 parliamentary election victory. An agreement would not only bring greater stability to Palestinian society, it would provide the basis for a return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, an essential requirement for long-term peace and security between Israel and the strip. The bitter infighting in the wake of Hamas’ 2006 victory that lead to the schism between Gaza and the West Bank in 2007 was not only the result of inflexible positions of Hamas, Israel and Fatah combined with the clumsy nature of international community’s response which damaged Palestinians economically without undermining Hamas politically, it was also the result of a wider systemic problem within the Palestinian Authority. The PA’s strongly presidential system created for President Arafat, watered down at the height of Second Intifada under intense international pressure to enable Mahmoud Abbas to take up the newly created post of Prime Minister, which in turn provided a platform for Hamas to form a government lacks the necessary separation of powers to operate with competing parties controlling differing institutions. The situation is further complicated by the international negotiating role on behalf of the Palestinian people everywhere being operated through the PLO.

There is a pressing need to come up with a successor to the Mecca Agreement that briefly offered hope of reconciliation between the two parties in 2007. The agreement called for the creation of a national unity government and would have allowed Hamas to join the PLO while allowing President Abbas, as Chairman of the PLO to continue negotiating a long-term settlement with Israel on the basis of previous agreements. A new deal might enable fresh presidential and parliamentary elections to be held, a significant bone of contention between the two parties, with Hamas arguing that President Abbas’s term expires at the end of January. It may ultimately lead to Hamas being able to join the PLO, enabling final status negotiations to move forward on behalf of a unified Palestinian platform. An agreement could also limit the level of friction in future situations where the presidency and legislative council are split between the parties.

Not only is a new deal an important step to enable an eventual final status agreement, progress is needed now to enable the PA’s return to Gaza in some form which may well be a requirement of any ceasefire agreement. PA control of the border crossings, potentially alongside the return of EU monitors or a new international force if Egyptian and Hamas objections can be somehow be over come, is seen as an essential step to enable the regular opening of Gaza’s borders in the long-term. Furthermore as Israel understandably will not tolerate continued weapons smuggling at Rafah so the PA or international force in coordination with Egypt must have the necessary power to identify and destroy tunnels, which may only achievable in the context of a wider agreement.

There is an element of wishful thinking that the incoming Obama administration will completely transform US Middle East policy from its current chilling detachment. However expectations are high that the new administration will be significantly more engaged in pushing for a peace agreement and ensuring Israel pays greater attention to the humanitarian situation facing the Palestinians over the longer-term. Increased diplomatic pressure will be required to shape a political environment where the Israeli public is willing to accept the necessary steps on settlements and Jerusalem.

Until the recent conflict Israel seemed destined to elect a hard-line rejectionist block in elections due on February 10th headed by a rejuvenated Likud Party, led by former PM Benyamin Netanyahu one of the key contributors to the failure of the Oslo Process. The current conflict has boosted the chances of the Kadima-Labor coalition although a Likud victory remains the most likely outcome given the continued strength of the religious and ultra-nationalist parties.

Obama’s team will have to move hard and fast to make clear that the US will not welcome an Israeli Government that rejects or seeks to indefinitely postpone the creation of a Palestinian State. It must make clear it will not placidly accept further delay in reaching a final status agreement based on the ‘Clinton Parameters’ established in the final days of the last Democratic administration.

Although the Israeli public does not take direction from the White House it would help shape the political environment in the 21 days from the inauguration to the Israeli elections. While a fresh Kadima-Labor victory would give the new administration hope that progress could be made on final status issues, a hard-right coalition would require a more radical shift in US policy to achieve any discernible progress in the coming years. Whether the Obama administration would be willing to use US economic and military assistance as leverage to bring a rejectionist Israeli government to the table, a tactic last used meaningfully by George Bush senior in 1991, may prove one of the most important foreign policy challenges facing the new administration come February.

Britain and the Euro: Time to revisit the debate?

2009-01-09T13:00:00.000Z

By Niall Ahern.

As we approach the end of 2008, it appears that the 'global credit crisis' may well continue to be a permanent feature in news headlines throughout 2009. The banking and credit crisis has proven that every country in the world is vulnerable to the effects of the downturn. The past year has been characterised by bank collapses, a sharp decline in house prices, credit drying up and unprecedented moves by governments to offer multi-billion dollar/pound bail-outs to banks and other businesses. As such, one is led to question whether there will be much to celebrate when the clock strikes midnight to see in the new year.

Looking specifically at the European Union, the economic crisis has led to a much sharper analysis of the economic and political policies being undertaken within EU member states. As EU heads of government and foreign ministers met in Brussels on 11 and 12 December for a two-day summit, there was undoubtedly another factor that was almost certainly in the minds of some of the attendees. This was the continuing decline of sterling which, at the time of the summit, had reached a low of 89 pence to the euro, the lowest since the single currency came into existence a decade ago. However, by 18 December, this had dropped even further as sterling reached an all-time low of 95.5 pence to the euro. Many analysts predict that it is only a matter of time before parity is met and at the rate it has been dropping, this could be reached well before the year is out. Gone are the days of Brits taking advantage of cheap weekend breaks to the continent, where three years ago a euro was worth as little as 69 pence. Britons flying to Eurozone countries over the holiday period and into next year will quickly come to realise that it may have been better value for money to holiday at home.

Worries about the demise of sterling have been coupled with recent debates within Denmark and Sweden - the only other 'old EU' economies that still remain outside the Eurozone - about proposing referendums on euro membership within the next year. In addition, Iceland, which isn't even an EU member state, has been suggested as being the possible 29th member of the EU, because, had it been a member, many of its recent economic troubles would have been avoided. All this leads back to the one country where the euro debate has been remarkably silent until now. In Britain there has been very little debate since Tony Blair and Gordon Brown rejected the idea of British membership of the euro in 2003 when the five economic tests were not met. However, as the events described above indicate, the suggestion that British politicians seem so reluctant to talk about – Britain adopting the euro – will surely have to be re-examined.
In fact, someone has already started the debate for them. Jose Manuel Barroso, the head of the European Commission, stated at the beginning of December that 'the UK was closer to joining the euro than ever before.' Although he admitted that the vast majority of British people are opposed to the idea, he went on to argue that 'those that matter in Britain' had been discussing it. One person rumoured to have been involved in such discussions is Lord Peter Mandelson, the Business Secretary and a staunch pro-euro supporter, but he claims that he cannot recall any such conversation. During the past few weeks, this suggestion has also been picked up by George Osborne, the Shadow Chancellor, although he, when speaking to business leaders in the north east, said that in the current economic climate, abandoning the pound would be the wrong thing to do. That said, Caroline Flint, the Minister for Europe, maintained the Government's status quo by stating that the British position on the euro has not changed. However, if sterling's decline continues, and if the euro does continue to become a stronger and more stable currency than the pound, then surely it is only a matter of time before more involved debates about possible British membership of the euro become more widespread.

It is important to remember however, that there are many obstacles that still stand in the way of British membership. And before any serious debates on the possibility of joining are even entered into, many other factors also need to be considered. First, this is the first real test for the euro, and how it reacts and deals with the worsening economic picture will be seen by many as a test of its credibility. Although membership of the euro has eliminated the possibility of currency crises for countries such as Ireland and Spain, it does not mean that they are completely immune to shocks resulting from the global crisis. External threats could still harm their economies and that is why the events which unfold over the next few months will provide a real test for the currency and the eurozone as a whole.

Other obstacles to British membership are based on Britain's very nature and relationship with the EU itself. The Government's 'five economic tests' would have to be re-examined and each would have to be met before membership is even properly considered. However, even if these tests were met, the rest of Europe would then have to accept Britain's bid to join. Following that, Britain would then have to undergo a transitional period of membership of the single currency exchange rate mechanism before qualifying for full membership, which would take some years anyway.

Finally and most importantly, the largest problem is political. There is currently a complete lack of balanced debate on the euro issue within Britain, with it tending to get left to bashing at the hands of the tabloid press and euro-sceptics. This means that the vast majority of the British public are unenthusiastic about the project. Study after study has revealed that if a referendum on membership were to be held, it would be easily lost. In addition, the 'Europe/euro debate' has never been a vote-winner in Britain and it is an issue that is likely to lead to further splits within political parties. As Labour closes down the gap which the Conservatives had managed to open up between the two parties in the polls, is Gordon Brown really likely to take Britain into a referendum on an issue that many predict the Government could never win? In addition, this also seems especially unlikely given that a general election must be called by the spring of 2010. Finally, it is important to note that even if the idea had crossed the minds of ministers over the past few weeks, aside from Lord Mandelson, no other politician has publically put forward a positive case for Europe which will be essential to lay the groundwork for the euro. If British politicians cannot even manage this, there is little chance of euro membership any time in the near future.

As economic events over the past year have demonstrated, nothing can be ruled out or predicted. But, for the moment, serious debate on the issue of British membership of the euro remains premature. The Government is playing safe by declaring that the policy hasn't changed and that they will focus on other economic issues first. It is too early to tell whether the decline of sterling will continue along with that of the British economy. That is because speculative report after speculative report differs on just how bad the recession will be both for Britain and the Eurozone. If sterling does come out of the economic crisis worse off, then surely Britain should seriously start to consider membership - even if this is only a consideration.

Finally, it is important to remember that throughout 2008, Gordon Brown has said repeatedly to the public that he will do 'everything in his power to protect the British economy'. Perhaps British membership of the euro may be just the thing to protect it. 2009 may indeed be one of the most interesting years for European Monetary Union, since it's introduction to the markets ten years ago. It may prove to be a very interesting year indeed.

Welcome

2008-12-11T15:43:00.000Z

The Foreign Policy Centre is pleased to join the blogosphere with the new FPC blog. The blog will be an opportunity for the FPC team and some of our associates to post short pieces about global issues that might be of interest to our readers. We hope you find it useful and interesting and most importantly, please let us know your thoughts by posting your comments!

A Revolution without Rights? Women, Kurds and Baha'is are searching for equality in Iran

2008-12-03T15:36:00.000Z

By Stephen Twigg. Source: Progress (www.progressonline.org.uk)

On 10 December 2008, the world celebrates the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but sadly there will not be much celebration in Tehran. Cyrus the Great, the Persian emperor from 559-529 BCE, is widely credited with producing the first known human rights charter and defending the rights of minorities. Yet in modern Iran women and minorities continue to be treated as second-class citizens.

While the world is focused on the Iranian nuclear programme, people in Iran are calling on its government to protect the human rights of its citizens. Many Iranians face routine persecution and discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnic or religious identity. A new pamphlet by the Foreign Policy Centre looks at the experiences of women, Kurds and Baha'is to highlight this challenge for equality in Iran.

Iran's constitution declares "the abolition of all forms of unjust discrimination and the provision of equitable opportunities for all." Iran is not living up to its own promises. The government regularly sidesteps its commitment to equality, especially when it comes to women and minorities.

As a theocratic state, Iran's government is influenced by a narrow interpretation of Shi'a Islam. This version of Islam provides women with fewer rights than men and it brands Baha'is (the country's largest non-Muslim religious minority) as heretics with little protection under the law. Ethnic Kurds are prevented from teaching their language and culture for fear that it will undermine Islamic unity. The marginalisation of these groups predates the Islamic Republic, but the ideology of the regime has institutionalised a pattern of discrimination.

The government regularly creates exceptions to principles of equality enshrined in human rights. It has increasingly used the pretext of national security to detain innocent women, Baha'is and Kurds. A cursory look at many of these cases shows the lack of credibility of such charges. Recently, Hiwa Butimar (a Kurdish historian), Esha Momeni (a student from California and women's rights petitioner) and the entire Iranian Baha'i leadership were separately arrested under 'national security' charges. The authorities have been unable to present any credible evidence to back these claims.

Other charges used to prosecute women, Kurds and Baha'is are ambiguous, such as 'acting against the regime,' 'enmity with God,' or 'insulting the sacred institutions of Islam.' The application of the law by judges is often unpredictable and arbitrary.

Members of all three groups are regularly denied their due process and detainee rights under the law. Legal processes are outlined in the Iranian constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure, but many are not adhered to in practice. Detainees are often held incommunicado for long periods of time without any knowledge of the charges against them.

Hard-line clerics and government-sponsored media also promote a culture of prejudice against minorities and women. They frequently use the label 'anti-Iranian' to discredit marginal groups. Baha'i youth engaged in community service, women promoting women's rights education, or Kurds teaching in their own language have all been branded with this defamatory label.

The state places obstacles to education and employment that prevent social advancement by members of these groups. It is official state policy to deny Baha'is access to universities, far fewer Kurds than the national average get places, and women are restricted in their choice of courses (even if they dominate numerically overall). All three groups have difficulty gaining employment in the public sector (Baha'is are officially banned).

Women, Baha'is and Kurds are far from the only groups that are marginalised, but their experiences highlight an issue that is gaining ground among Iran's human rights activists. The struggle for equality is happening on the street corners and in the seminaries of Iran. National human rights organisations like the Campaign for Equality argue that Islam is fully compatible with human rights. Prominent clerics such as Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri and Ayatollah Yousof Sanei are challenging the rigid interpretations of the ruling clerics.

Iran says it has a sovereign right to acquire nuclear weapons, but it has misunderstood what it takes to be a leader in the international community. For 60 years, the Declaration of Human Rights has been the universal standard for what it means to be a respected state in the community of nations. If Iran wants to play its part in the international community, it needs to revisit the noble principles set into motion by Cyrus and protect human rights at home.

Stephen Twigg is Director of the Foreign Policy Centre and Chair of Progress

Obama and Iran: A Victory for an Enlightened Foreign Policy?

2008-12-03T15:33:00.000Z

By Mariam Ghorbannejad.

November 4th 2008 was by all accounts an historic day for the United States of America. Not only had the nation elected their first African-American president but they had done so by a landslide in the popular vote unseen since Democratic nominee Lyndon Johnson's win in 1964.

A twist of fate just six weeks or so before had swung the electorate in Obama's favour. His popularity soared as the American economy worsened. Perhaps if the economy had not taken centre stage, attention would have shifted to healthcare, education and foreign policy where the margin separating Obama from McCain would have been much smaller. George W. Bush had made a point of his role as commander-in-chief and he may have been passing the baton onto John McCain had events panned out differently. But that is what a matter of weeks can do in politics.

It may not have been Barack Obama's foreign policy that got him elected by the US electorate. But in the international arena, it was his stance on the war in Iraq and Afghanistan and openness to dialogue with Iran without pre-conditions that appealed to world leaders.

In particular, the letter of congratulations sent by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Obama seemed to garner much media attention. According to the Iranian President's spokesperson, Gholam-Hussein Elham who was quoted by the Tehran Times, a similar letter of congratulations had been sent to Bush back in 2006, proposing a return to religious principles as a means of restoring confidence.

But this time, the act of sending a congratulatory message was seized upon as representing a fundamental shift in foreign policy direction. It was touted as having the potential to resurrect some kind of diplomacy between Iran and America that had been abruptly halted in 1979 after the US hostage crisis.

Was it overly-optimistic to presume that the United States would reach out to Iran? After all, it was Republican President George W. Bush who had named the Islamic Republic part of the 'axis of evil' alongside Iraq and North Korea in February 2002.

Given one of the key themes of Barack Obama's foreign policy is to start a withdrawal of combat troops from neighbouring Iraq, trying to engage in 'aggressive personal diplomacy' with Iran and other regional powers looks to be a sensible move. In order to ensure Iraqi stability, he has pledged to develop a new relationship with Iran.

In exchange for cooperation on terrorism and nuclear issues and an end to Iran's involvement in Iraq, the American president-elect has said that he would meet the country's leaders (at a time and place of his choosing) and offer them economic inducements.

Should the Iranian government refuse to collaborate, stronger unilateral sanctions will be applied, alongside multilateral sanctions at the Security Council and 'sustained action outside the UN to isolate the Iranian regime' will be taken.

Although the Islamic Republic of Iran has had sound economic growth hovering between about four and five percent since 2004, high consumer inflation and unemployment coupled with a forecast decline in oil revenues* suggest that economic inducements could prove tempting.

The incoming American president's carrot of membership of the World Trade Organisation and economic investment may encourage some conservatives in the Iranian government to soften their stance to US diplomatic engagement.

Both Barack Obama and vice-president-elect Joe Biden oppose the Kyl-Lieberman amendment, passed by Congress, which says that the US should use its military presence in Iraq to counter the threat from Iran. Obama made his opposition to the Iraq war clear from the outset and he believes that it would be reckless to extend it into Iran. As such, he has introduced a resolution in the Senate declaring that no act of Congress gives the Bush administration authority to attack Iran.

Obama has even gone so far as to say that he may not seek 'regime change' in the Islamic Republic. This could possibly allay fears in Iran that the West is only willing to engage with an Iranian government they do not view as hostile.

Memories of the coup d'etat that deposed Iran's Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq in the early 1950s, an operation funded by the Americans and the British, are still fresh in the minds of many Iranians.

However, Obama's rival for the Democratic nomination, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, called talks with Iran, North Korea and Syria with few pre-conditions a propaganda victory for America's international foes.

Her recent acceptance of the post of US Secretary of State could therefore prove significant in the future course of American foreign policy. Initial expressions of delight from Iranian quarters at a new era of Iranian-American relations may have been a little premature.

Figures obtained from the Economist Intelligence Unit

Obama faces the toughest challenges since Franklin Delano Roosevelt

2008-12-03T13:39:00.001Z

By Adam Hug. Source: Public Servant

As the celebrations die down, and the ticker tape is cleared away, the political reality of Barak Obama's transition is becoming clearer. Pundits argue with some accuracy that President-elect Obama will enter office with a daunting in-tray, perhaps as tough a set of problems as any new leader has faced since FDR. Two unresolved wars, a financial crisis, an economic slump, an unstable trade deficit and large portions of US debt owned by China and other countries, not exactly top of the US's Christmas list, are just some of the challenges the new administration has to look forward to. However, he faces these challenges with a level of goodwill internationally that has no recent comparison.

After years when even committed Atlanticists have nervously tried to keep their distance from a politically toxic Bush Administration, with British ministers such as Lord Malloch Brown announced that the incoming Brown Government would be 'no longer joined at the hip' to the Americans, politicians from around the world are now jostling to stand as close as possible to the President-elect.

One of Obama's first challenges is to translate his political capital into European troops on the ground in Afghanistan where he is committed to a 'surge'-like policy of increased troop deployment and political engagement of Pashtun groups previously sympathetic to the Taliban. This at a time when there are growing calls for the deployment of an EU force in the DRC and with the countries who have already made significant deployments such as Britain are facing overstretch.

Similarly, following the inconclusive G20 talks, there will be the need for the new US administration to take a leading role in coordinating the fiscal stimulus packages and overhaul the global financial architecture. This will involve swiftly building a strong working relationship with Gordon Brown who has taken unofficial leadership of the global response to the crisis as Bush fades away. Promisingly, Obama and Brown share favourite tools. Obama's pledge to cut taxes for 95% of Americans by reversing Bush's tax cuts, likely to form the major plank of any Obama fiscal stimulus, will in fact largely be driven by tax credits, the Clintonian mechanism heavily favoured by the Prime Minister.

The choices Obama makes on his economic team will be critical not only to the response to the economic and financial crises. The protectionist language used on the campaign trail by Obama and his fellow Democrats have given some cause for concern that the US may seek to pull up the drawbridge in an attempt to save US jobs. While there is likely to be a cooling of support for free trade, particularly in light of the current economic situation, the centrist track records of all names floating for senior roles at Treasury or on the Council of Economic Advisors such as Tim Geithner, Jamie Dimon, Larry Summers, Robert Rubin and Paul Volker would suggest that a radical retrenchment is unlikely.

Similarly the international community will hope that the Poznan Climate Change Conference in December marks the swan song of an obstructionist US position on climate change and that the incoming administration will join the race to a final deal to replace the Kyoto Protocol at next winter's Copenhagen Summit. It has yet to be seen if the economic crisis will limit some of Obama's ambitions for tackling climate change but there are encouraging signs in some of the strangest places. The proposed $25 billion bailout for the motor industry would be tied by Democrats to helping the US car giants to develop new fuel efficient vehicles, looks like an example of how Obama will try to use fiscal stimuli to support the development of green technology as well as kick start the economy.

Given the bailouts for the financial services sector and Detroit, commentators have been questioning the ability of the new administration to deliver the comprehensive package of healthcare reforms it campaigned for. Many of the proposed mechanisms in the Obama healthcare plan are familiar to British observers: an overhaul of IT systems including the transfer of medical records from paper to computer, publishing performance data and encouraging competition between providers. However the more radical element of the plan is to enable universal coverage through the creation on a National Health Insurance Exchange, offering a new state backed insurance scheme based on the Federal Employees Benefits Programme used by members of congress alongside existing insurance packages. This would be supported with a range of tax credits for families and small businesses and requirement on larger firms to provide insurance or contribute to the costs of the national plan. DC chatter sees campaign co-chair and former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle as the front runner for the position as the new administration's Secretary for Health and Human Services. It will need an experienced hand such as Daschle to manage the legislative obstacles likely to be thrown in the path of reform by the health insurance industry and manage expectations with the likely delays to elements of the package enforced by the economic crisis.

The challenges Obama faces are grave but the combination of international goodwill, a promising team of built from Obama's savvy campaign operatives and experienced Clinton hands and a sense of purpose borne from adversity gives hope that these challenges can be met.

Turkey, Europe's future

2008-11-19T16:31:00.000Z

Source: The Guardian Comment is Free

Turkey's bid to join the EU offers Europe the choice of embracing its internal diversity or resorting to an insular idea of itself.

Drowned out by the acclamation for the Obama victory last week, the European commission quietly released its progress report on Turkish accession to the EU. While it welcomed Turkey's economic performance and the progress it had made strengthening its legal system, the commission's message was that there was a lot done but a lot still to do.

The road towards Turkish membership is long and rocky but I believe that Turkey is central to the future development of the EU. The eventual decision to accept or reject Turkey will have significant ramifications for the type of organisation it will become.

Put crudely, Turkish membership will signify a choice for Europe between becoming an outward-looking union at peace with its internal diversity that prioritises the economic and security needs of its members, or an insular, almost parochial grouping, searching for an imagined cultural homogeneity. This is why the Foreign Policy Centre has released a new pamphlet to coincide with the report arguing that we have to clearly lay out the practical case that both the EU and Turkey would be more prosperous and secure if accession is successful.

Turkish membership is often described as a "win-win" situation for the EU and Turkey but it is clear that victory will be hard fought. The majority of European public opinion opposes Turkish membership and leading politicians in member states including France, Germany and Austria have publicly stated that they do not see Turkey as a future member and have pushed for a nebulous "privileged partnership". Turkish support for membership has also waned in recent years due to the sluggish progress of the accession process and the opposition of some EU leaders.

The challenge set before advocates of Turkish membership then, is to transform a climate of cynicism and opposition to ensure membership is granted once Turkey meets the strict criteria required for entry.

Prosperity and security form the twin pillars of the case for Turkish membership. Turkey has been at the bedrock of European security since the cold war, joining Nato in 1952 and guarding Europe's south-eastern flank against the former Soviet Union. Today it sits at the gateway to the Middle East, the Caucasus and central Asia, a key strategic player in all three regions. Turkey can play a critical role in our energy security, where it is the key alternative transit route to Russia for Caspian oil and gas and the swiftest route for Iraqi crude.

The key dynamics of the economic relationship between Turkey and the EU are clear. The EU is the market for 56% of Turkish exports, ten times that of any other export destination, while Turkey is the EU's fifth largest export market. European firms annually invest over €3bn in Turkey. After economic setbacks in 1994 and at the turn of the millennium, Turkey has grown at an average annual rate of 6.8%. According to the World Bank, eventual Turkish membership should boost its GDP per capita growth by 1.5% per year, and allow it to expand as a market for European goods.

There remain significant political challenges that Turkey must face up to if it is to be ready for membership. This summer prosecutors in Ankara came within a whisker of removing the current Justice and Development (AKP) government on charges of undermining the secular state that included the decision to allow women to wear the hijab in universities. Had it succeeded, it would have dealt a hammer-blow to hopes of Turkish membership in the foreseeable future. Other outstanding issues include restrictions on freedom of speech, the future of Cyprus and the challenges faced by the Kurdish community over language rights and identity. These issues must be fully resolved prior to Turkish membership, but in these and the other main challenges Turkey faces, the rigorous criteria provided by the EU accession process act as an immense force for change.

At its core, the argument must be that if Turkey succeeds in fully implementing the EU's accession criteria, the toughest given to any candidate country, it will have earned the right to join the EU. If Turkey has undergone the massive economic, political, social and legal transformation required, the denial of its right to join would be an affront to the principles of fairness that must underpin the EU and could lead a spurned Turkey to re-orientate itself away from the West, forming new alliances in the Middle East and central Asia to the detriment of Europe.

Although Turkey has already benefited from economic and political reforms necessary for accession to take place, the pace of change needs to increase, improving the quality of life in Turkey, and strengthening support for membership, both among Turks and EU citizens. Turkey must also reach out to EU citizens with effective public diplomacy, busting myths and raising awareness of Turkey as a modern European society with deep roots in the continent's history. These steps must be reciprocated within the EU through cultural exchange and the use of economic links to break down barriers.

The European business community has an important role to play in standing up for Turkey and this must include leadership at the European level.

European companies operating in Turkey should take the lead in educating their workforces about the country and show the benefits that closer co-operation with it can bring. Similarly Europe's trade unions can play a proactive role in informing their members and dampening fears over Turkish migration damaging employment opportunities.

Failure to grant Turkish accession would be one of the greatest strategic mistakes the EU could inflict upon itself, one that would be hugely harmful to business and undermine European prosperity and security. The path to accession is challenging for both the EU and Turkey, but advocates of an open and progressive Europe need to stand up and make the case that it is a challenge that we must not fail to meet.

Hutton and Afghanistan: To surge or not to surge?

2008-11-14T14:34:00.000Z

John Hutton chose Remembrance Day to deliver his maiden speech as Defence Secretary, and as the subject, a conflict described only just over a year ago as Britain’s ‘forgotten war’: the conflict in Afghanistan. In an address titled ‘Afghanistan – Worth the Sacrifice,’ Mr Hutton asserted that the war may yet become the ‘defining conflict of this century.’
The situation that British servicemen and women find themselves in in Afghanistan can no longer be described as ‘forgotten’. The conflict has increasingly found itself in the headlines, and the subject of numerous documentaries, debates and public discussions, and not necessarily (although not exclusively), for the right reasons. This has been in part due to the decrease in size and prominence of British operations in Iraq, but also due to the number of British lives that have been lost in Afghanistan, and the increasing frequency with which they seem to be being lost.

124 British troops have died in Afghanistan since 2001, including two Royal Marines in Helmand Province this week. Just over 8,000 British troops are currently serving in Afghanistan, compared to half that number – around 4,000 – in Iraq. The number of British lives lost in recent times as a result of the conflict was no doubt uppermost in Mr Hutton’s mind as he prepared to speak on 11 November to justify the ‘sacrifices’ Britain has made thus far in pursuit of her political and military aims in Afghanistan.

As one might have expected then, at least half of Mr Hutton’s speech constituted a detailed explanation of the UK national security imperative driving the political objectives which keep British troops in Afghanistan; in short that, should the Taliban be allowed to regain power of the country, it would once again provide a ‘secure refuge’ which would allow Al Qaeda to re-group there and to plan and implement terrorist acts upon countries including the UK.

While this argument is compelling and undoubtedly persuasive when justifying why British troops remain in Afghanistan seven years almost to the day after the Taliban were ousted from Kabul, and why the government intends for them to stay ‘until their job is complete’, those that were hoping for a more detailed exposition of how the sacrifices that have already been made will not be in vain, and how future sacrifices might be avoided, or at least minimised, were disappointed.

General Petraeus’ review and predicted overhaul of US operations in Afghanistan is widely regarded as acceptance that something needs to change strategically in order for quicker progress to be made. However, the Defence Secretary did not mention in his speech an issue that could prove to be key; the suggestion of a 30,000-strong troop surge, 5,000 of which would be made up of British forces. The idea has recently been linked with high profile figures including President-elect Barack Obama, and General Sir David Richards, the incoming Head of the British Army. Both of them, if recent reports are true, believe that a change in military strategy, in the form of a massive troop surge will be key to achieving military and political objectives and precipitating the eventual withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan.

Mr Hutton has indicated that he believes the role of Ministers to be to take the advice of their generals on issues of military strategy and act on it, rather than formulating such strategies themselves. While this is surely something to be welcomed, it appears that strategic advice on a surge has yet to be sought, and much less received. But, unless General Sir David Richards changes his mind, or is ‘uninstalled’ by the Ministry of Defence between now and next August, this seems likely to be his advice to the Defence Secretary, and Mr Hutton, it appears, might be wise to take it. Indeed, there were already reports emerging at the time of writing, that a request for a further 2,000 British troops was being anticipated by the Prime Minister from President-elect Obama’s new administration, but the exact number and timing of their deployment, would be dependent on the draw down in Iraq.

It is well known that the Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, does not believe that British troops returning from Iraq should be sent straight on to operations in Afghanistan, and for good reason. This perhaps provides an indication as to the division of opinion amongst the generals, which Mr Hutton will find himself facing when he does seek their advice on the future of British military strategy in Afghanistan. It will no doubt prove infinitely more complex than simply seeking and acting upon advice – there will be stark and difficult choices to be made, as one would expect in matters of war and peace. And, given the backdrop of the approaching general election, which must take place before the summer of 2010, making those choices could prove even more difficult. Yet, as Nick Clegg, the Leader of the Liberal Democrats, has pointed out, ‘…the worst option is to do nothing, because at the moment we have too few troops fighting an enemy that cannot be defeated by military means alone.’

The Defence Secretary freely admitted in his speech that ‘it would be a huge mistake for any politician to take [public] consent for the deployment of our armed forces for granted. Politicians have to earn and re-earn that consent.’ And yet, in a poll of just over 1,000 members of the British public conducted by ICM and released by the BBC this week, more than two-thirds of those questioned (68%) believed that British troops should be withdrawn from Afghanistan within the next year, and less than one quarter (24%) believed troops should stay. This is perhaps no surprise given the increased profile of the conflict itself and of the deaths which it has brought about. Whether the respondents believed that a troop surge was likely to take place in the next year, and that troops would therefore be able to withdraw more easily afterwards, is unknown, but that would perhaps have been a more useful, if less ‘poll-friendly’ question. The Ministry of Defence rebutted this, quoting their most recent MORI poll which indicated that over 50% of the public supports the UK armed forces’ presence in Afghanistan, and that a recent Chatham House survey found only 37% of people favoured a withdrawal. Despite this, the MoD admitted that they do ‘need to do more to explain to the UK public why it’s so important that the UK continues to support the Government… and the international presence in Afghanistan.’ It seems Mr Hutton would do well to keep his own words at the forefront as he seeks strategic advice from his generals and decides whose advice to take, should he face a difference of opinion. The old adage that, in the midst of war, winning hearts and minds at home is as important as winning those abroad has never been truer.

Even if a surge were to be advised, the advice taken, acted upon, and successfully sold to the British public, opinion will still need to be convinced that the government is honouring the Military Covenant, or duty of care, that it owes to the armed forces. The British public needs to be reassured that British troops are adequately prepared, equipped, renumerated, supported and rested both before, during and after their deployment on operations, not least those in Afghanistan. Though Mr Hutton confirmed in an earlier interview, that he was happy that all equipment now being used by British forces in Afghanistan was up to the job in the majority of cases, he did concede that mistakes had been made in the past. The Ministry of Defence has indeed made much progress in terms of both equipment provision and reforming defence procurement procedures to enable ‘off the shelf’ emergency purchases to be made, now categorised as Urgent Operational Requirements or UORs. And while no-one would deny that unforeseen equipment malfunctions do occur in the heat of battle, and that such occurrences are an unfortunate fact of war, the number and extent of avoidable equipment inadequacies – both in terms of the availability, quantity and quality of equipment – has been borne out recently by a high profile catalogue of testimonies from serving and ex-service people, as well as coroners’ conclusions identifying preventable deaths and injuries suffered by British servicemen and women. These will have no doubt done nothing to instil the public with confidence in the government’s ability to properly prepare and equip British troops for the job it is asking them to do. Admittedly, inquests follow actual events with a considerable time lag, so if Mr Hutton’s optimism is to be believed, one might expect the number of preventable deaths and injuries to drop considerably in the future.

To properly address the equipment and other Covenant-related issues, Mr Hutton needs to be open about the overarching issue of government funding for the armed forces. The level of funding that may or may not be available, given the government’s current economic commitments in other areas, needs to be, if not debated publicly, then certainly taken into consideration in any strategic choices and that consideration needs to be articulated to the British public effectively. Furthermore, the fundamental and related issues of recruitment and retention, especially as they affect the British Army, also need to be addressed, and be seen to be addressed, as a matter of urgency.

To ensure that past and future British sacrifices in Afghanistan will not have been in vain therefore, and to enable public support for the operation to be re-established and maintained, Mr Hutton and the government will need to move decisively. They must be seen to be tackling the conflict itself directly and efficiently, both in terms of lives lost, and from an economic point of view. Avoiding an ever-longer, more drawn-out, bogged down, expensive and bloody conflict than has already occurred is imperative. The effectiveness of the operation, in all senses, will now be publicly scrutinised as never before, and this against the backdrop of an unprecedented global economic crisis. Furthermore, what might be considered as issues slightly outside the scope of the conflict, but nonetheless integral to it, must also be addressed, and be seen to be being addressed, as a matter of urgency – equipment, retention, rest and recuperation, etc. It would perhaps be prudent for Mr Hutton to adopt a more holistic approach in his justification of the British presence in Afghanistan in the future. As well as providing a thorough outline of the national security imperative behind the operation, which is no doubt important, addressing the wider issues outlined above, as well as tackling head-on the issue of whether to ‘surge’ or not, will undoubtedly help to improve the public’s perception of the value of a more sustained British effort in Afghanistan, and perhaps of the accompanying sacrifices that such an effort might entail.